United Nations A/69/711–S/2015/1

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2015
English
Original: French

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 63
Report of the Human Rights Council

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 29 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

By note verbale of 22 July 2014, Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Conventions, notified the High Contracting Parties that consultations on the possible convening of a conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War would resume, in accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 64/10 and in the light of the various reports prepared by the depositary regarding the implementation of this recommendation. As indicated in the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 7 October 2014 (A/HRC/27/76), in response to a request for additional information in respect of Human Rights Council resolution S-21/1, Switzerland also informed the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights about the resumption of consultations.

From 28 July to 3 December 2014, Switzerland, through its Permanent Mission in Geneva, held extensive consultations with a broad cross section of High Contracting Parties from all geographic regions, emphasizing its willingness to engage in bilateral dialogue with any other Party that so wished. It also consulted with international stakeholders, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The consultations focused on the desirability of holding the conference as well as its objective, agenda and modalities. Acting as an impartial facilitator, Switzerland thus sought to determine the will of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions. In accordance with existing practice, the depositary conducted these consultations on the understanding that the proposed conference should be inclusive and constructive and have the objective of strengthening respect for international humanitarian law. Based on the comments and contributions of the High Contracting Parties, international humanitarian law and the two previous conferences held in 1999 and 2001, a draft declaration and draft modalities were developed with the goal of reflecting the views of as many of the High Contracting Parties as possible.

In accordance with the agreed modalities, the final draft declaration would be presented for adoption by consensus, without a vote. The Parties should be

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represented at the level of permanent representatives of the permanent missions in Geneva. Only statements by established groups would be accepted. National statements could not be delivered in the plenary but could be transmitted in writing to the depositary up to 24 hours before the start of the conference. The modalities also stated that the conference would be closed to the public and the media; only selected organizations would be invited to participate as observers.

On 9 December 2014, the depositary found that a critical mass of High Contracting Parties from across regions supported the organization of a conference on the basis of the modalities and the text of the final draft declaration. Therefore, by note verbale of 10 December, the depositary notified all of the High Contracting Parties that a conference would take place. A small number of States Parties expressed their opposition to the holding of a conference and did not participate.

On 17 December 2014, 128 High Contracting Parties participated in the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, held at the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, and adopted by consensus a 10-point declaration (see annex). The depositary and representatives of ICRC and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East delivered statements and several High Contracting Parties spoke on behalf of established groups. The depositary will soon transmit the official conference documents to all High Contracting Parties. This concludes the actions of the depositary in respect of the recommendation set out in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 64/10.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 63, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Paul **Seger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 29 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Declaration of 17 December 2014 adopted by the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention

1. This Declaration reflects the common understanding reached by the participating High Contracting Parties to the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 17 December 2014, mindful of the recommendation by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 64/10 of 1 December 2009.

2. The participating High Contracting Parties reaffirm the statement of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 15 July 1999 and the Declaration of 5 December 2001.

3. The participating High Contracting Parties reiterate the need to fully respect the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law, according to which all parties to the conflict, and as such also non-State actors, must respect, at all times, inter alia, (1) the obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives; (2) the principle of proportionality; and (3) the obligation to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects. In addition, the participating High Contracting Parties emphasize that no violation of international humanitarian law by any party to a conflict can relieve the other party from its own obligations under international humanitarian law.

4. The participating High Contracting Parties emphasize the continued applicability and relevance of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which all High Contracting Parties have undertaken to respect and to ensure respect for in all circumstances. As such, they call on the occupying Power to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. They also remind the occupying Power of its obligation to administer the Occupied Palestinian Territory in a way which fully takes into account the needs of the civilian population while safeguarding its own security, and notably preserve its demographic characteristics.

5. The participating High Contracting Parties recall the primary obligation of the occupying Power to ensure adequate supplies of the population of the occupied territory and that whenever it is not in a position to do so, it is under the obligation to allow and facilitate relief schemes. In that case, they further recall that all High Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of humanitarian relief and shall guarantee its protection. In this regard, the participating High Contracting Parties reiterate their support to the activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, within its particular role conferred upon it by the Geneva Conventions, of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and of other impartial humanitarian organizations, to assess and alleviate the humanitarian situation in the field. Beyond, all parties to the conflict, and as such also non-State actors, should make all possible efforts to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for the population of the occupied territory.

6. The participating High Contracting Parties emphasize that all serious violations of international humanitarian law must be investigated and that all those responsible should be brought to justice.

7. The participating High Contracting Parties express their deep concern about recurring violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict, and as such also by non-State actors, including in the context of military operations and attacks directed against and emanating from the Occupied Palestinian Territory since the Conference of High Contracting Parties on 5 December 2001 and the resulting great suffering of the civilian population. They are particularly concerned about the number of victims among the civilian population in densely populated areas.

8. The participating High Contracting Parties express their deep concern about the impact of the continued occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. They recall that, according to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 9 July 2004, the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, at least insofar as it deviates from the Green Line, and its associated regime, are contrary to international humanitarian law. They equally express their deep concern, from an international humanitarian law standpoint, about certain measures taken by the occupying Power in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including the closure of the Gaza Strip. They reaffirm the illegality of the settlements in the said territory and of the expansion thereof and of related unlawful seizure of property as well as of the transfer of prisoners into the territory of the occupying Power.

9. With regard to the conduct of hostilities, the participating High Contracting Parties underscore that the following acts are, among others, prohibited by international humanitarian law for all parties to the conflict, and as such also for non-State actors: (1) indiscriminate attacks of any kind, including attacks which are not directed at specific military objectives, and the employment of a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective or whose effects do not meet the requirements of the principles mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Declaration; (2) disproportionate attacks of any kind, including excessive destruction of civilian infrastructure; (3) destruction of property, carried out inconsistently with the principles mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Declaration; (4) attacks against protected persons and objects, including medical buildings, material, transports, units and personnel, as well as humanitarian personnel and objects, unless and for such time as they have lost their protection against direct attack; (5) attacks against civilian objects, including schools, unless and for such time as they are military objectives; (6) the location of military objectives in the vicinity of civilians and civilian objects, when it would be avoidable and (7) the use of civilians as human shields.

10. The participating High Contracting Parties reiterate the need to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, and stress that respect for and implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and international humanitarian law in general is essential to achieve a just and lasting peace.

United Nations A/69/712

General Assembly

Distr.: General
6 January 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 120 and 121

Strengthening of the United Nations system

United Nations reform: measures and proposals

Enhancement of the administration and financial functioning of the United Nations

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

In its resolution 68/306, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to review and report on any impediments or obstacles with regard to the accounts opened by permanent missions of Member and observer States or their staff in New York, and the impact that any such impediments or obstacles had on the adequate functioning of their offices, and also to report on the financial relations of the Secretariat with the banking institutions in New York. The present report contains an analysis of the impact experienced by missions and their staff members on the basis of information collected from them. The report also presents information provided by the host country, in response to the invitation made in the resolution, on the norms and regulations applicable to the banking system regarding the confidentiality of personal data and information.

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I. Background

1. In its resolution 68/306, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to review and report on any impediments or obstacles with regard to the accounts opened by permanent missions of Member and observer States or their staff in New York, and the impact that any such impediments or obstacles had on the adequate functioning of their offices, and also to report on the financial relations of the Secretariat with the banking institutions in New York. The Assembly invited the host country to submit information on the norms and regulations applicable to the banking system regarding the confidentiality of personal data and information.

II. Data collection

2. To obtain relevant information, the Secretariat conducted a survey with two components, one addressed to permanent missions and the other to their staff. The missions were requested to provide a consolidated response to the second component and to complete the questionnaire online. A hard copy of the questionnaire was also provided.

3. To ensure information security, the questionnaire was set up in an internal information and communications technology system hosted in a United Nations enterprise data centre compliant with international standards for information security, where it was monitored and protected by firewalls and intruder detection systems.

4. As at the time of the closure of the questionnaire, of the 193 Member States and two observer States, 34 permanent missions had submitted valid responses (17.4 per cent). Responses received subsequently have not been reflected herein.

5. The data gathered have been used only in the preparation of the present report. The analysis presented herein does not identify any specific permanent mission or its staff in order to protect private and personal data and information.

III. Impacts on accounts opened by permanent missions in New York

6. Of the 34 permanent missions that responded, 19 (55.9 per cent) experienced the unilateral closure of bank accounts by financial institutions in New York from 2010 to 2014, with most closures (9) occurring in 2011. On average, two accounts were closed per mission in that period. Of those 19 missions, 7 (36.8 per cent) had one account closed by a financial institution, while 6 (31.6 per cent) had two closed. Twelve (63.2 per cent) indicated that the reason for the closure was linked to local regulatory requirements.

7. In total, 16 permanent missions (84.2 per cent) found that the resulting difficulties had had an impact on their normal operations, while 3 (15.8 per cent) did not find that to be the case. For most (15 missions, or 78.9 per cent), the effects in monetary terms were unknown, but some were able to quantify the effects (ranging from $75,000 to $50 million).

8. The effects included difficulties in making payments to staff members and vendors (73.7 per cent), making payments of assessed and voluntary contributions to the United Nations (57.9 per cent) and transferring funds (52.6 per cent).

9. After the closures, 17 missions (89.5 per cent) took action to open new bank accounts in New York, while 2 (10.5 per cent) used other accounts opened previously.

10. The permanent missions that took action to open new accounts can be categorized into three groups: those that managed to open new accounts in New York, those that managed to open new accounts outside New York and those that did not manage to open new accounts.

Permanent missions that managed to open new bank accounts in New York

11. Of those missions that took action, 15 (88.2 per cent) managed to open new accounts in New York, most within a month (13, or 86.7 per cent). For a few missions, it took between one and three months. The missions in this category approached an average of five financial institutions in New York, with 60 per cent experiencing at least one refusal. More than half of those that experienced a refusal understood it to be due to local regulatory requirements, while others did not know why. As an interim measure during the time between the closure of the accounts and the opening of new accounts, eight missions (53.3 per cent) used alternate accounts. The remaining seven (46.7 per cent) made no interim arrangements.

Permanent missions that managed to open new bank accounts outside New York

12. Of those missions that took action, one (5.9 per cent) managed to open a new account outside New York, doing so in less than three months. It approached four financial institutions in New York, but was refused for unknown reasons. It then approached a financial institution outside New York and was able to open an account. It used cash for necessary transactions as an interim arrangement.

Permanent missions that did not manage to open new bank accounts either in New York or elsewhere

13. Of those missions that took action, one (5.9 per cent) was unable to open a new account, either in New York or elsewhere. It has not found a solution to date, meaning that it uses cash-based transactions for its normal business.

IV. Impacts on accounts opened by staff members of the permanent missions in New York

14. Of the 34 permanent missions that responded, 22 (64.7 per cent) had staff members whose bank accounts were closed by financial institutions in New York. In total, 100 staff members were affected (30 per cent). The closures experienced mostly occurred during the period 2013-2014, with some in 2011 and 2012. Some 45.5 per cent of those missions understood that the closures were due to local regulatory requirements, while for others the reasons were unknown.

15. All missions noted that the closures had led to the affected staff members facing difficulties in leading their daily lives. Some 90.9 per cent could not ascribe a monetary value to the impact, while some estimated it to range from $55,000 to

$2 million. The closures affected the ability of staff members to make the financial transactions needed for daily life such as paying bills (86.4 per cent), repaying loans (36.4 per cent), receiving salaries and allowances (81.8 per cent) and transferring funds (54.5 per cent).

16. Of the 22 missions whose staff members were affected, 16 (72.7 per cent) provided assistance in opening new accounts, including by identifying financial institutions in New York (68.8 per cent), organizing information sessions (56.3 per cent) and providing referral letters to financial institutions (18.8 per cent). One mission said that its support cost $5,000, but others were unable to estimate their assistance in monetary terms.

17. After the closures, 97 affected staff members (97 per cent) from 21 missions took action to open new accounts in New York, while 3 per cent did not. The reasons for inaction cannot be determined from the responses.

18. The staff members who took action to open new accounts can be categorized into three groups: those who managed to open new accounts in New York, those who managed to open new accounts outside New York and those who did not manage to open new accounts.

19. More than 60 per cent of the missions reported that the affected staff members in the first two categories had made no interim arrangements, while 27.3 per cent said that the affected staff members had used alternate bank accounts held either in or outside New York.

Staff members who managed to open new bank accounts in New York

20. Of those affected staff members who took action, 92 (94.8 per cent) from 19 missions managed to open new accounts in New York. Most of the missions reported that the affected staff members had opened new accounts within a month: 11 (57.9 per cent) stated that it had taken less than two weeks, while staff in 7 missions (36.8 per cent) were able to open new accounts within a month. The number of financial institutions in New York that the affected staff members in this category approached ranged from one to six. Nearly 60 per cent of the missions stated that affected staff members had approached a financial institution. There were eight missions (42.1 per cent) whose affected staff members experienced refusals by financial institutions in New York. A total of 15 affected staff members (16.3 per cent) were refused by an average of 2.3 financial institutions. The missions concerned stated that the refusal was either due to local regulatory requirements or unknown reasons.

Staff members who managed to open new bank accounts outside New York

21. Of those affected staff members who took action, four (4.1 per cent) from two missions managed to open new accounts outside New York. On average, it took less than two weeks for them to do so. One mission noted that the affected staff members had opened new accounts outside New York owing to the refusal by a financial institution in New York on the grounds of local regulatory requirements. The other mission did not specify the reasons. The average number of financial institutions that refused their application was one.

Staff members who did not manage to open new bank accounts either in New York or elsewhere

22. Of those affected staff members who took action, one (1 per cent) did not manage to open a new account, either in New York or elsewhere. Whether the staff member has found a solution is not clear from the response received.

V. Financial relations of the Secretariat with the banking institutions in New York

23. The Secretariat currently maintains financial relations with some 40 banking institutions in New York, pertaining to deposits, payments, investments and foreign currency exchange. Six provide consumer banking services.

VI. Norms and regulations applicable to the banking system regarding the confidentiality of personal data and information

24. The information set out in the paragraphs below was provided by the host country in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 68/306.

General legal framework: federal and state law, statutory and common law

25. With regard to commercial relationships such as that between a bank and its customer, there is no single source of United States law. Federal statutes, state statutes and common law standards (which themselves can vary by state) all play a role in determining what a bank can and cannot do with a customer's personal financial information and what the customer's recourse is if the bank exceeds its authority. Some legal systems have a single comprehensive legislative framework for data protection in all contexts — governmental and commercial, and treating all aspects of commercial data protection alike — supported by a unified administrative enforcement mechanism in the form of a data protection authority. United States privacy law has developed differently for different contexts, meaning that the privacy of personal information held by financial institutions is regulated differently to that of the same information held by non-financial commercial enterprises, by the federal Government or by state and local governments. United States financial privacy law comes closer to having a comprehensive, federal legislative framework than other sectors of United States privacy law, but state statutes and common law still play a significant role.

Federal law

26. A bank customer's privacy rights concerning personal information collected and held by the bank are protected principally by the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The statute, enacted in 1999, eliminated statutory and regulatory barriers limiting the consolidation of banking, securities and insurance. Under the privacy provisions of the Act, and their implementing regulation ("Regulation P"), covered financial institutions, including commercial banks and credit unions, have an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of their customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers' non-public personal

information. "Non-public personal information" is any personally identifiable financial information obtained by a financial institution from or about an individual that is not publicly available elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that the Act's protection applies only to financial information from or about an individual that is personally identifiable. Thus, for example, the Act does not limit a bank's ability to share aggregated demographic information about its customer base with other institutions, or even information pertaining to individuals so long as that information has been stripped of all personal identifiers such as name, address and identification numbers. It should also be noted that the Act's protection does not extend to financial information from or about commercial enterprises or other institutions, except insofar as it contains information about individuals.

27. Under the Act, a bank's obligation to protect its customers' privacy manifests principally in a requirement to provide customers with clear and conspicuous notice describing its information-sharing policies and procedures upon initiation of the relationship, and annually thereafter, and also to provide its customers with an opportunity to opt out of the information-sharing before sharing any non-public personal information with third parties. A bank does not have to provide an opportunity to opt out with regard to some types of information-sharing, however, including as necessary to effect, administer or enforce a transaction that the consumer requests or authorizes; to protect against fraud, unauthorized transactions, claims or other liability; for required institutional risk control; to law enforcement and specified regulatory agencies or for an investigation on a matter relating to public safety; and to comply with federal, state or local law or other applicable legal requirements.

28. In addition to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, other federal statutes limit banks' use and sharing of some specific types of information. In particular, the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates banks' use of consumer reports obtained from consumer reporting agencies — a type of information that includes such things as consumer credit reports and credit scores. The Act prohibits a bank from obtaining such a consumer report except for specified permissible purposes, including for the evaluation of a credit transaction, account review or insurance underwriting. It also creates a strong disincentive for a bank to share information from a consumer report by considering such a bank to be a consumer reporting agency in its own right, subjecting it to onerous legal obligations enforced by the threat of private lawsuits. It should be noted, however, that a statutory exception allows a bank to share consumer report information with its affiliates, so long as it provides consumers with notice of the practice and an opportunity to opt out.

State privacy statutes

29. State laws that provide more robust protection for financial information than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act are deemed not inconsistent with federal law and are accordingly not pre-empted. One such law is the California Financial Information Privacy Act. Under that legislation, financial institutions are prohibited from sharing non-public personal information with non-affiliated third parties for marketing purposes unless they receive the affirmative consent of the consumer, but may share non-public personal information with affiliates for marketing purposes so long as the consumer has been provided with notice and an opportunity to opt out. The exemptions enumerated in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act have largely been preserved.

30. Some other states have comparable statutory schemes, but most do not. Importantly, New York does not; thus, information that a financial institution obtains in New York is protected primarily by the federal statutes outlined above and the common law.

Common law

31. While the common law is almost by definition impossible to summarize comprehensively, some broadly applicable common law principles affect banks' ability to use or share the personal information of their customers.

32. In general, a bank cannot use or share a customer's personal information in such a way as to harm the customer's reputation or livelihood without running the risk of being held liable for damages in a civil lawsuit by the customer. This tort liability can arise from the bank's wilful or negligent actions, but it is easiest to prosecute such a lawsuit if the customer experiences calculable economic damages attributable to the bank's actions. It is much more uncertain whether or how a customer can sue a bank for a perceived breach of privacy owing to unwanted commercial solicitations or the mere fact that personal information was shared, without adverse consequences specifically attributable to the sharing.

33. In addition to tort liability, if a bank has by contract taken on specific obligations with regard to the treatment of a customer's personal information, the bank's breach of those contractual obligations can render the bank liable for damages within the framework established by the contract itself. Among the contracts between banks and their customers that can give rise to such obligations are deposit account agreements, custodial agreements, loan agreements and real estate mortgage loans and deeds of trust. The common law does not assume any such obligations, however. Any contract must explicitly state the obligation for the bank to be held to it.

VII. Conclusion

34. On the basis of the responses received, 19 missions have experienced unilateral closures of their bank accounts, as have 100 staff members from 22 missions. Among those affected who took action to open new accounts, 88.2 per cent of the missions and 94.8 per cent of the staff members were able to do so, mostly within a month. Although the impacts of the closures are difficult to ascertain in monetary terms, most of those affected cited difficulties affecting normal day-to-day business and personal life.

35. The Secretariat appreciates the assistance of the host country authorities in ensuring that all permanent missions of Member and observer States to the United Nations and their staff members are accorded full facilities to perform their functions by ensuring that they are provided with banking facilities on an equal, fair and non-discriminatory basis.

VIII. Action to be taken by the General Assembly

36. **The General Assembly is requested to take note of the present report.**

United Nations A/69/713

General Assembly

Distr.: General
7 January 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 69 (a)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Letter dated 3 December 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 60/124 of 15 December 2005, by which the Assembly established the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) Advisory Group to advise me on the use and impact of the Fund. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 21 of the resolution, I hereby submit a note on the meeting of the Advisory Group, which took place in New York on 23 and 24 October 2014 (see annex).

As summarized in the note, the Advisory Group expressed appreciation to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the CERF secretariat for the management of the Fund.

The Advisory Group discussed how to deal with the potential misuse of CERF funds and the challenge of communicating potential misuse to donors. The Group reaffirmed that any misuse of CERF funds should be treated in accordance with existing oversight rules and mechanisms of the recipient agencies and be informed by the ongoing system-wide efforts to ensure coherence of treatment of fraud within the United Nations.

The Advisory Group met with senior officials from the United Nations Population Fund and the United Nations Children's Fund to discuss how to improve the timeliness of disbursement of funds by the United Nations to its implementing partners, issues related to communication of potential misuse of CERF funds; and the visibility of CERF. The agencies acknowledged the importance of CERF as a unique and invaluable life-saving financing mechanism and praised the speed and effectiveness of the Fund.

The Advisory Group also considered a number of policy issues, including the CERF risk management plan; progress made following the recommendations from the independent review of the Performance and Accountability Framework; and the independent country reviews of the added value of CERF in the Sudan and the

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Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Group was also briefed on the World Humanitarian Summit.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of Member States and observer missions.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Note on the meeting of the Central Emergency Response Fund Advisory Group (23 and 24 October 2014)

Summary of the meeting

1. The Advisory Group of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was established by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/124 to advise the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the use and impact of the Fund. The Advisory Group's second meeting of 2014 was held in New York on 23 and 24 October and was chaired by Catherine Walker (Australia).

2. The Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, briefed the members of the Advisory Group on the use and management of CERF from 1 January through mid-October 2014. The meeting was an opportunity for the members to interact directly with the senior leadership of two CERF recipient agencies — the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) — on their experience with the use of CERF funds. The Group also interacted with other representatives of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), focusing their discussion primarily on the timeliness of partnership arrangements between United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, and the International Organization for Migration and their implementing partners.

3. The Advisory Group also discussed the mechanisms and processes in place to deal with potential misuse of CERF funds and processes for communicating a potential misuse of funds to donors. The Group, furthermore, received and considered updates on key policy issues, including the analysis and the lessons learned from the roll-out of the revised resident Coordinator/humanitarian coordinator reporting process on the use and impact of CERF funds; the CERF risk management plan; progress made following up on recommendations from the independent review of the performance and accountability framework; and the independent reviews of the added value of CERF in the Sudan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Group was also briefed on the World Humanitarian Summit process.

4. Further to these discussions, the Advisory Group would like to make the following observations and recommendations:

Recommendations and conclusions

5. The Emergency Relief Coordinator informed the Advisory Group that CERF had committed $436 million to 45 countries and territories from January through mid-October 2014. She provided an update on enhanced efforts by the CERF secretariat to ensure the strategic use of CERF funds, particularly through strengthened prioritization guidance and the revamped training framework that target decision makers in the field, focusing primarily on resident/humanitarian coordinators and the senior leadership within the humanitarian country teams). She highlighted the regional approach used by CERF in responding to humanitarian needs in countries affected by regional crises, which is one of the Fund's comparative advantages, focusing on rapid response allocations to South Sudan and the Central African Republic regional crises, as well as on the second 2014

underfunded emergencies round, which targeted the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions. The Emergency Relief Coordinator informed the Advisory Group about two recently commissioned studies, which would assess the feasibility of increasing the CERF annual funding target and explore new funding modalities, among other potential revisions. In a discussion about increasing the CERF funding target, she noted that the issue had been raised before and that any revision would need to take into consideration an overall view of humanitarian financing, as well as broader questions about how humanitarian work was done, its effectiveness and the links between humanitarian action and development. The Advisory Group expressed its appreciation to the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the CERF secretariat for their management of CERF.

6. Considering the topic of the potential misuse of CERF funds and challenges in communicating the misuse, the Advisory Group reiterated that fraud posed a serious risk to humanitarian action and to the reputations of CERF and the United Nations. The potential misuse of CERF funds should be treated in accordance with the existing oversight rules and mechanisms of the recipient agencies and informed by the ongoing system-wide efforts to ensure coherence in the treatment of fraud within the United Nations. Communication of fraud should be guided by the principles of transparency and follow due process. The Group noted that recipient agencies should be proactive in ensuring that the CERF secretariat would be informed of any case of misuse of CERF funds at the start of an investigation. The members requested that the CERF secretariat proceed with mapping the existing regulatory frameworks and drafting standard operating procedures for actions to be taken by CERF in the event of fraudulent use of CERF funds. The Advisory Group also agreed to address the issue again at its next meeting.

7. The Advisory Group welcomed the opportunity to meet with the senior leadership of two CERF recipient agencies (UNICEF and UNFPA). The two agency representatives acknowledged the importance of CERF funds for their operations. They updated the Group on their efforts related to timely disbursement of CERF subgrants and responded to queries about the visibility of CERF and communication of potential misuse of CERF funds.

8. The agency representatives emphasized the crucial role of CERF grants in supporting their agencies' humanitarian operations — both rapid response and underfunded emergencies grants — although noting that the total annual amount of CERF grants over the past years had been consistent, while the needs had grown. The representatives advised that the way UNICEF and UNFPA maximized their use of CERF depended mainly on the availability and speed of other funding sources, and emphasized that CERF funds helped to save lives and deliver concrete results. The representatives further highlighted that CERF had helped kick-starting activities in the sector of maternal and reproductive health, which was often overlooked or failed to attract sufficient funding in emergencies. The agency representatives committed to continue to assist the CERF secretariat in its efforts to enhance the visibility of CERF beyond the immediate stakeholders; and committed to sharing with the CERF secretariat, in accordance with their internal oversight rules and regulations, information on the potential misuse of CERF funds should this occur.

9. Both representatives emphasized the importance that their organizations attached to the improvement of timeliness of disbursement of subgrants to their

implementing partners, referring to ongoing internal efforts and measures already put in place, for example, the revision of partnership agreements. While the representatives emphasized the difficulties, such as administering a high number of subgrants and numerous multisector agreements, and difficulties in identifying suitable partners in the field, they both noted that contextual difficulties, such as changes in security conditions, and country-specific nuances could skew disbursement figures, and that disbursement times did not necessarily reflect implementation realities. Both representatives acknowledged, however, that further steps were needed to speed up the disbursement of CERF subgrants, including further streamlining their internal disbursement procedures and by better understanding cases and contexts where subgrants were particularly slow to reach implementing partners. They committed to continue working, together with senior management in their organizations, towards the improved timeliness of disbursement of CERF funds.

10. The Group appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with other representatives of IASC and welcomed the ongoing work of the IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team on best practices to accelerate the implementation of CERF-funded projects. The members took note of the variety of systemic and contextual factors affecting the timeliness of disbursement and implementation, including the potentially competing requests for strengthened accountability and risk management systems. They reiterated that rapid disbursement of funds was central to the Fund's life-saving mandate and key for maintaining the reputation of CERF as an effective humanitarian financing mechanism. The Group members called upon the senior management of IASC members to demonstrate continuous measurable improvements, and requested the CERF secretariat to develop targeted key messages on the timeliness of disbursement for the donors' representatives to raise at meetings of the Executive Board of the respective recipient agencies. The Group will again address the issue and assess the progress made by CERF recipient agencies at its next meeting.

11. The members welcomed the analysis and the lessons learned from the roll-out of the revised resident/coordinator/humanitarian coordinator narrative reporting process. The Group was encouraged by the findings confirming that the quality of reports was high, that the reporting process was consultative, that CERF added value in humanitarian response and that the funds were used for the intended purpose. They encouraged the CERF secretariat to further strengthen the use of information collected through the resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator reports, including for demonstrating the impact of CERF to external audiences.

12. The Advisory Group received an update on the semi-annual CERF risk management plan and the revision of the performance and accountability framework. The Group acknowledged their importance for risk mitigation and advocacy purposes and asked the CERF secretariat to provide an update at its next session. The Group members acknowledged the independent reviews of the added value of CERF in the Sudan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which offered valuable insights into CERF-funded operations in those countries.

13. The Advisory Group expressed its appreciation for the briefing on the World Humanitarian Summit and emphasized the link with ongoing processes that might result in proposals to revise the humanitarian financing architecture, including potential changes to CERF.

Administrative matters

14. The Advisory Group expressed its appreciation for the work of its Chair, Catherine Walker (Australia) and welcomed María Andrea Albán Durán (Colombia), Nestor Koko (Côte d'Ivoire), Samson Palia Wangusi (Kenya), Per Örneus (Sweden), Manuel Bessler (Switzerland) and Jesus Domingo (Philippines), who began their terms in October 2014.

15. The next meeting of the CERF Advisory Group is to be held in Geneva in May 2015.

United Nations A/69/714–S/2015/8

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 29 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in October 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-00198 (E) 120115 130115

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Annex to the identical letters dated 29 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 October 2014	1448	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank positioned along the technical fence, 200 metres west of point TP16, pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
4 October 2014	1920	Israeli enemy soldiers directed obscene language at soldiers in a Lebanese Army patrol opposite the Kafr Killa road.
5 October 2014	1325	From within the occupied Shab'a Farms, an Israeli enemy patrol fired shots at the Lebanese Army observation point in the Saddanah locality outside the town of Shab'a, injuring a Lebanese soldier.
7 October 2014	1405	Israeli enemy forces fired six artillery rounds, which landed outside the town of Kafr Shuba. Between 1510 and 1545 hours, they fired two rounds, which landed outside the town of Kafr Shuba; 15 rounds, which landed in the Shamis locality outside the town of Shab'a; and two rounds, which landed in Saddanah outside the town of Habbariyah. No one was wounded.
8 October 2014	1940	From a military vehicle, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory from the area between the position east of Ra's al-Naqurah and Ra's al-Naqurah 2.
9 October 2014	0910	From within occupied territory opposite the town of Naqurah, at point B3, Israeli enemy soldiers pointed machine guns mounted on vehicles towards Lebanese Army patrol soldiers.
11 October 2014	1845 1900	From within the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Shahl position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
12 October 2014	0005 0030	From within the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Shahl position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1630 1800	From within the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy combed the perimeter around its positions using medium machine guns. Moving vehicles were also heard.
14 October 2014	1100 1600	In Saddanah outside the town of Shab'a near observation point OP4 of the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), an Israeli enemy bulldozer lifted earthen berms and excavated the land where an explosive had detonated. The enemy also installed a pole mounted with a surveillance camera.
21 October 2014	1025	From within the Duhayrah gate position, a Merkava tank pointed its cannon towards the Lebanese Army Ghaba'in position. At 1105 hours, it returned into occupied territory.
	1915 2000	The Israeli enemy fired nine flares over the Radar position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
22 October 2014	0800 1630	In the Jabal al-Rus-Saddanah locality, an Israeli enemy bulldozer levelled the ground and fortified the earthen berms. The bulldozer was escorted by three Merkava tanks and approximately 15 enemy soldiers, who took up combat positions.
	0910	From within occupied Palestinian territory opposite the Lebanese Army Wazzani observation point, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank and approximately 30 soldiers approached. They opened the gate, crossed the technical fence, went down to the river bank and walked towards the resort without violating the Blue Line. The tank pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
23 October 2014	1110	On the outskirts of the town of Mays al-Jabal in the Kurum al-Shiraqi area, while the shepherd Sa'id Husayn Hamadi was grazing his herd along the Blue Line near points B64 and B56, the Israeli enemy fired a warning shot from its Jawbiyyah position. The shot landed between the technical fence and the Blue Line. No one was wounded.
24 October 2014	1533 1553	Opposite the town of Kafr Killa, an Israeli enemy tank pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
27 October 2014	2046	On the outskirts of the town of Marun al-Ra's, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising six soldiers crossed the Blue Line northwards into Lebanese territory by a distance of some 15 metres. At 2303 hours, the enemy patrol departed into occupied territory.
28 October 2014	0650	Opposite the town of Aytarun near point BP25, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising 10 soldiers crossed the Blue Line by several metres. At 0804 hours, the enemy patrol departed into occupied territory.
	0800	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising 50 soldiers approached the area opposite the Kafr Killa-Udaysah road, near the channel by point B82. The soldiers spread out in the orchards and made provocative gestures at the civilians passing by on the road. At 1000 hours, they returned into occupied territory.
	2110 2145	The Israeli enemy combed the perimeter surrounding the Radar position inside the occupied Shab'a Farms with medium weapons.
30 October 2014	1651 1750	The Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards the Tall al-Rahib position in the direction of the town of Ayta al-Sha'b inside Lebanese territory.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 October 2014	0355	From within occupied Palestinian territory opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, 150 metres from the shore (buoy No. 3), an Israeli enemy launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds.
31 October 2014	0440	From its position in Ra's al-Naqurah, 250 metres from the shore, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for 30 seconds in the region of the line of buoys.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 October 2014	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1130 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0935	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2025 hours over Rumaysh.
3 October 2014	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1450 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
5 October 2014	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Kafr Killa.
6 October 2014	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1540 hours over Yarun.
	1710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0725 hours on 7 October over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Juniyah. It circled over the sea off Juniyah, Jubayl, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0710 hours on 7 October over the sea off Naqurah.
	2240	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0735 hours on 7 October over Rumaysh.
7 October 2014	0900	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 1635 hours over Rumaysh.
	0925	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0955 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1005	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Rumaysh.
	1545	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
8 October 2014	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 October 2014	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1820 hours over Rumaysh.
12 October 2014	1015	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1630 1800	Israeli helicopters circled over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
13 October 2014	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1125 hours over Naqurah.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0955 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
17 October 2014	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1600 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1915 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Rumaysh.
18 October 2014	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1000 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
20 October 2014	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
21 October 2014	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 October 2014	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 October 2014	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1445 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
24 October 2014	0605	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1310 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1440	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Tripoli before leaving at 1850 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
25 October 2014	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2000 hours over Rumaysh.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Al-Arz before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 October 2014	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1745 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0915	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0950	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the south before leaving at 1455 hours over Kafr Killa.
27 October 2014	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1720 hours over Aytarun.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
28 October 2014	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1750 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
29 October 2014	0925	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1120 hours over Aytarun.
	1500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Rumaysh.

United Nations A/69/715–S/2015/5

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 24 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in November 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 24 December 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 November 2014	1027	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank near the Jabal al-Tayyarah position pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory. The tank left at 1055 hours.
	1450	Outside the town of Kafr Shuba, opposite observation point OP4 of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Indian contingent, an Israeli enemy patrol fired shots into the air in the direction of civilian Khidr Nab'ah while he was grazing his herd. He was not wounded. He fled with his herd in the direction of the town of Shab'a.
6 November 2014	0930	In the locality of Jabal al-Shahl on the outskirts of the town of Shab'a, near observation point OP2 of the UNIFIL Indian contingent, an Israeli enemy patrol violated the line of withdrawal by a distance of some 50 metres. The soldiers stationed at the point shouted at the patrol, which then retreated into the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1315	In the area of Metulla–Sahl al-Khiyam, near point B90, an Israeli enemy David vehicle approached from within occupied Palestinian territory as civilian Ahmad al-Rajab was grazing his herd within Lebanese territory some 15 metres from the Blue Line. Six soldiers disembarked, stood along the technical fence and began to hurl stones at the shepherd and his flock, and shouted at and threatened him. A Humvee vehicle then approached and positioned itself next to the technical fence. At 1330 hours, both vehicles departed in the direction of the Metulla settlement.
7 November 2014	0915	Opposite the Kafr Killa–Udaysah road, near points B82 and TP37 inside occupied Palestinian territory, a tractor escorted by an Israeli enemy patrol sprayed pesticide within Lebanese territory near the technical fence.
10 November 2014	1230 1500	The Israeli enemy installed a radome on a pole at the Ruwaysat al-Alam position, inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
11 November 2014	1014	From a location near the Israeli enemy Jabal al-Tayyarah position, four enemy soldiers monitored Lebanese territory using scopes mounted on their weapons, which they pointed towards Lebanese Army soldiers on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line.
18 November 2014	0725 0745	An Israeli enemy tank positioned itself near the Jabal al-Tayyarah position opposite Kafr Killa and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
19 November 2014	0745 0825	An Israeli enemy tank positioned itself near the Jabal al-Tayyarah position opposite Kafr Killa and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
	0900 1230	Opposite the town of Marun al-Ra's, near point BP22, an Israeli enemy excavator, escorted by a patrol comprising two personnel carriers, five Jeeps and some 20 soldiers, excavated a water channel and performed maintenance on it. The excavator boom and six of the soldiers crossed the technical fence, without violating the Blue Line.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1305	In the vicinity of the Wazzani River, a Merkava tank inside occupied Palestinian territory pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
	1325	Opposite the Wazzani resort, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank and seven soldiers opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by some 10 metres. At 1355 hours, a second patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and 26 soldiers crossed the technical fence. The soldiers disembarked on the bank of the Wazzani river without violating the Blue Line and placed a suspicious-looking device underneath a tree on the enemy side, opposite the Khalil Abdullah resort. The tank pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory. At 1500 hours, they returned into occupied territory and closed the gate.
20 November 2014	0935	In Labbunah, Israeli enemy soldiers from the Jall al-'Alam position trained their machine guns on and made obscene gestures at the members of a Lebanese Army patrol.
	1120	While Lebanese Army soldiers were conducting a patrol (Intelligence Directorate, southern branch) along the Lebanese-Palestinian border near the Metulla settlement, seven Israeli enemy soldiers aimed their weapons at the Lebanese soldiers. At 1135 hours, the Israeli enemy soldiers returned into occupied territory.
	1215	As Lebanese Army soldiers patrolling the border between Lebanon and occupied Palestine reached point OP8 (Wazzani), an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles approached from the occupied side. Five soldiers disembarked and aimed their weapons at the Lebanese Army patrol members. At 1225 hours, the Israeli enemy patrol returned into occupied territory.
21 November 2014	0745	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, a Defender vehicle and two soldiers stopped opposite the town of Kafr Killa. The soldiers pointed their weapons towards Lebanese territory and directed abusive language at passers-by. Two other soldiers approached opposite the Kafr Killa channel, took up positions within the emplacement, loaded their weapons and pointed them towards Lebanese territory, and proceeded to direct abusive language at passers-by. At 0900 hours, the patrol returned into occupied territory.
	0800	As some Aytarun municipality workers were planting trees within Lebanese territory in the Khallat al-Ghamiqah area on the outskirts of the town of Aytarun, opposite point B56-1, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Merkava tanks and two Humvee vehicles approached. The patrol positioned itself along the technical fence and the tanks pointed their cannons towards Lebanese territory. Six soldiers disembarked, spread out and trained their machine guns on the workers. At 1200 hours, the patrol returned into occupied territory.
23 November 2014	1300	While Lebanese Army soldiers were conducting a patrol along the Lebanese-Palestinian border, at the Abbad Lebanese Army observation point, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle and 10 soldiers approached from within occupied Palestinian territory. The soldiers armed and trained their weapons on the Lebanese Army patrol, swearing at a Lebanese soldier in Arabic. At 1325 hours, the enemy patrol returned into occupied territory.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1245	Israeli enemy soldiers stationed at the Ramta position fired five shots into the air inside occupied Palestinian territory, in order to prevent some shepherds and their herd from crossing the Blue Line.
	1417 1545	From the Jabal al-Tayyarah position in Metulla, an Israeli enemy tank pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory.
28 November 2014	1510	Within occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Lebanese Army Duhayrah position, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Humvee vehicle with four soldiers on board approached. One of the patrol members said to a Lebanese Army soldier, "If you were a man, you would shoot". The Lebanese soldier did not respond.
29 November 2014	1015	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising 20 soldiers, four Merkava tanks, three personnel carriers, two Hummer vehicles and a Land Rover vehicle planted an Israeli flag near the Birkat al-Naqqar gate and did maintenance work on the cameras installed at the Birkat al-Naqqar position. At 1100 hours, the patrol departed.
30 November 2014	1403	From the Ruwaysat al-Alam position, an Israeli enemy Merkava tank pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory and at the Lebanese Army Birkat al-Naqqar position.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 November 2014	0440	An Israeli enemy naval patrol off Naqurah directed a searchlight towards a Lebanese boat 50 metres from the line of buoys within Lebanese territorial waters.
19 November 2014	0705	Six large balloons were seen at sea off Ra's Naqurah, floating north from occupied Palestinian waters into Lebanese territorial waters.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 November 2014	1225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2240 hours over Rumaysh.
6 November 2014	0905	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1335	Three Israeli enemy helicopters violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They headed south, releasing decoy flares over the above-mentioned waters before leaving at 1405 hours.
	1405	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2300 over Rumaysh.
7 November 2014	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 November 2014	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0945 hours over Naqurah.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace. It entered over the line of buoys and headed north.
9 November 2014	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1030 hours over Kafr Killa.
10 November 2014	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2050 hours over Naqurah.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Rumaysh.
	1015	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2255	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace. It circled over the towns of Rumaysh and Marun al-Ra's, releasing 10 decoy flares. It left at 2305 hours, heading towards occupied Palestinian territory.
11 November 2014	1050	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1640 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2135 hours over Naqurah.
12 November 2014	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Naqurah.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Sidon. It circled over the sea between Khaldah and Sidon before leaving at 1730 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
13 November 2014	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1025	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1530 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2000 hours over Rumaysh.
15 November 2014	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1030 hours over Kafr Killa.
17 November 2014	0045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 0155 hours over Naqurah.
18 November 2014	0845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1840 hours over Rumaysh.
19 November 2014	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 1645 hours over Naqurah.
	1520	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Labbunah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1530 hours over occupied territory.
27 November 2014	1225	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They entered over the sea off Juniyah and headed southeast. They left at 1240 hours over Rumaysh.
29 November 2014	0555	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1520 hours over Rumaysh.
30 November 2014	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

United Nations A/69/716

General Assembly

Distr.: General
8 January 2015
English
Original: Spanish

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 44
Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Letter dated 3 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the press release issued today by the Government of the Argentine Republic on the anniversary of the illegitimate occupation of the Malvinas Islands by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 44, concerning the question of the Malvinas Islands.

(*Signed*) María Cristina **Perceval**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

15-00147 (E) 120115 120115

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Annex to the letter dated 3 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Spanish]

Press release

On 3 January 1833, the Malvinas Islands were occupied by British forces, which evicted the Argentine population and authorities lawfully established there and replaced them with subjects of the occupying Power. The Argentine Republic immediately protested against that unlawful act of force, which continues, and did not consent to it at any time.

The Argentine Government reaffirms once more the imprescriptible sovereignty rights of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which are part of its national territory.

The illegitimate British colonial occupation, which has been going on for 182 years now, is aggravated by the provocation and defiance of the United Kingdom, which refuses to resume negotiations over sovereignty as directed by the United Nations mandate in force, established through resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly and endorsed by nine subsequent resolutions, as well as by more than 30 resolutions of its Special Committee on decolonization. This mandate has been reiterated since then by several regional and biregional forums.

While the unlawful occupation of this part of the Argentine territory persists, the United Kingdom continues to perpetrate unilateral activities for the exploration and exploitation of renewable and non-renewable natural resources in unlawfully occupied Argentine maritime areas. This situation, together with the growing continued British military presence in the South Atlantic, has led to expressions of concern and rejection in the region and elsewhere.

Our region has been unanimous in rejecting the British military presence in the South Atlantic. Likewise, it has expressed concern about the above-mentioned unilateral activities through several declarations at the summits of the Heads of States members of MERCOSUR and associated States, of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and at the Ibero-American Summit. Other regions have also expressed their support for the resumption of negotiations, inter alia at the South American and Arab Countries Summit and the Africa-South America Summit.

More recently, the Latin American Energy Organization and the Group of 77 and China have expressly recognized the right of the Argentine Republic to take legal actions, with full respect for international law and relevant resolutions, against unauthorized hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation activities in its maritime areas, which include the continental shelf.

Argentina recalls that 2015 will mark the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). That resolution was the first one to refer specifically to the question of the Malvinas Islands. Since it recognizes the existence of a sovereignty dispute, it calls upon the two parties involved to reach a settlement by means of negotiations, taking into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands.

As expressed by the United Kingdom in 1966 upon the commencement of the bilateral negotiation process on sovereignty over the Islands, which lasted almost two decades, the Argentine Republic remains willing to find a peaceful and lasting solution to the dispute in the same constructive spirit expressed during the years in which both countries studied several formulas to reach a settlement in compliance with the 50-year-old resolution.

Argentina welcomes with great satisfaction the full validity of the United Nations mandate and wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to thank the international community for the strong and various expressions of support. Likewise, Argentina wishes to renew its firm commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, international law and multilateralism.

Upon recalling the 182nd anniversary of the plunder, the Argentine Government reiterates once more its permanent and sincere readiness to resume the bilateral process of negotiations with the United Kingdom, as requested by the international community, in order to find a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute and thus put an end to an anachronistic situation that is incompatible with the evolution of the current postcolonial world.

United Nations A/69/717–S/2015/7

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 January 2015
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 107
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventieth year

Identical letters dated 7 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

From 2011 to 22 December 2014, some 16,861 Syrian civilians, including 1,810 children, have been killed by bombings and mortar shell attacks carried out by armed terrorist groups against Syrian cities. The number of civilians injured in those bombings and attacks stands at 14,980, including 2,689 children.

Those figures cover all Syrian governorates, with the exception of Raqqah. They do not include the members of the Syrian Arab Army, security services and law enforcement forces who died in clashes with terrorist organizations and individual terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries who were brought into Syria by those States that support terrorism in order to wreak havoc in the country, in a stark and ongoing violation of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1989 (2011), 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014). The above-mentioned figures also do not include those civilians who were assassinated, had their throats cut or were killed in some other savage, criminal manner favoured by those terrorist organizations.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic once again calls on the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility and condemn and hold accountable the regimes of those States that support terrorism, at the forefront of which are the governing regimes of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It should also require those regimes to cease their destructive practices, which threaten international peace and security.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 107, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative

15-00200 (E) 120115 120115

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United Nations A/69/718–S/2015/11

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 32
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 8 January 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of November 2014 (see annex).

The irresponsible, provocative actions of Azerbaijan, including snipers shelling, during the reporting period resulted in the death of soldier Vitali Poghosyan on 9 November, while soldiers Harut Sevlikyan, Arman Tadevosyan, Hayk Hovsepyan and Gegham Zaqaryan were wounded.

Armenia strongly condemns these continued provocations and the meaningless use of force by Azerbaijan and calls upon the latter to strictly observe the ceasefire regime.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 32, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tigran **Samvelian**
Chargé d'affaires

15-00218 (E) 160115

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Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2015 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-30 November 2014

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations – 3,430

   Total number of shots – 37,579

   AK (AKM) – 23,181, PK – 9,978, SVD – 1,455, DSHK – 546, RPK – 387, Black arrow – 97, Istiglal – 1,725, RPG-7 – 23, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) – 170, 2A42 – 9, GP-25 – 8

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations – 367

   Total number of shots – 3,182

   AK (AKM) – 895, PK – 1,330, SVD – 363, DSHK – 232, RPK – 41, Black arrow – 266, Istiglal – 10, Utyos (NSVP/NSVT) – 15, RPG-7 – 30

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 November	N. Karmiraghbyur	1050	AKM	3	
2.			1555	Black arrow	2	
3.		Movses	1300	Black arrow	5	
4.				DSHK	5	
5.			1400	Black arrow	1	
6.		Berqaber	2240	AKM	1	
7.	2 November	Chinari	1010	AKM	1	
8.		Voskepar	1047		6	
9.		Mehrab	1300	SVD	16	
10.		Aygepar	1655	SVD	2	
11.			1700		1	

Abbreviations: AK (AKM), Kalashnikov rifle (7.62 mm/5.45); PK, Kalashnikov machine gun (7.62 mm); SVD: 7.62 mm sniper rifle; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Black arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon; Istiglal, 14.5 mm machine gun; Utyos (NSVP/NSVT), 12.7 mm machine gun; RPG-7, antitank grenade launcher; 2A42, 30 mm automatic cannon; GP-25, grenade launcher.

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
12.	3 November	Aygepar	0730	AKM	1	
13.			1800	SVD	3	
14.		Berdavan	1640	PK	12	
15.		Voskepar	2205	AK	10	
16.			2225	PK	25	
17.	4 November	Eraskh	0855	SVD	1	
18.	5 November	Chinari	1005	Black arrow	10	
19.		Vazashen	1900	RPK	10	
20.				AK	20	
21.				PK	20	
22.		Eraskh	2145	AK	7	
23.	7 November	N. Karmiraghbyur	1035	SVD	5	
24.		Aygedzor	1120	Black arrow	3	
25.			1310		3	
26.			1740		3	
27.		Qarvachar	1330	Black arrow	10	
28.		Movses	1500	SVD	3	
29.		Mehrab	1610		10	
30.		Sarigyugh	2030	AKM	4	
31.		Berqaber	2240	AKM	1	
32.			2255		2	
33.			2255	SVD	4	
34.		Eraskh	2320	AKM	1	
35.	8 November	N. Karmiraghbyur	0725	AK	5	
36.			1055	SVD	2	
37.			1500	Black arrow	6	
38.			1550	Black arrow	2	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
39.		Movses	0850	AK	2	
40.			1410	SVD	1	
41.			1410		1	
42.			1525	PK	5	
43.		Aygepar	0940	SVD	9	
44.			0955		8	
45.			1550	Black arrow	6	
46.		Shavarshavan	1645	AKM	15	
47.		Mehrab	1850	SVD	8	
48.		Aygedzor	2137	PK	8	
49.	9 November	Movses Movses	0815	SVD	12	1. At 0840, near the mountain of Kalachuk at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Vitali Poghosyan was fatally wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
50.			2100	AK	2	
51.		Aygepar	1030	PK	4	
52.			1525		1	
53.		Chinari	1035	SVD	5	
54.		Khndzorut	1105		10	2. At 1240, near the village of Ashaghi Abdurakhmanli at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Harut Sevlikyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
55.		Barekamavan	1415		10	
56.		Mehrab	1545	Black arrow	2	
57.		Baghanis	1605	SVD	5	
58.		Berqaber	1630	AK	5	
59.		Yanshak	2130	PK	60	
60.	10 November	Chinari	0135	AK	5	
61.			0315	AK	6	
62.			2248	PK	30	
63.			2326	PK	25	
64.				AKM	40	
65.		Movses	0825	SVD	5	
66.			1950	RPK	2	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
67.		Dovegh	1205	Black arrow	2	
68.				SVD	3	
69.			1215	SVD	3	
70.		Mehrab	1300	Black arrow	5	
71.		Vazashen	1400	AKM	6	
72.		Aygepar	1730	Black arrow	1	
73.		Baghanis	1820	AKM	3	
74.		Berdavan	2130	PK	15	
75.	11 November	Aygepar	1150	DSHK	3	
76.			1315	SVD	5	
77.			1445	AKM	2	
78.			1510	SVD	5	
79.			1535	Black arrow	3	
80.			1605		1	
81.			1645	NSVP	10	
82.			1655	SVD	3	
83.				NSVP	4	
84.			1730	SVD	2	
85.		Paravaqar	1850	SVD	2	
86.		Voskepar	2145	AKM	15	
87.		Vazashen	2300		8	
88.	12 November	Eraskh	0010	AK	1	
89.		Aygepar	0930	AKM	1	
90.			1010	Black arrow	1	
91.			1010	PK	6	
92.			1000	Black arrow	2	
93.			1350	PK	2	
94.			1455	DSHK	12	
95.		Mehrab	1100	Black arrow	20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
96.		Vazashen	1125	AKM	4	
97.			1705	AKM	2	
98.		Paravaqar	1515	DSHK	1	
99.				SVD	2	
100.				AKM	7	
101.			2045	SVD	1	
102.		Kayanavan	1720	AKM	2	
103.		Lev	1800-1830	SVD	20	
104.		Eraskh	2020	AKM	1	
105.		Barcruni	2120	Black arrow	10	
106.				DSHK	10	
107.				PK	50	
108.			2215	Black arrow	10	
109.				DSHK	10	
110.			2310	AKM	2	
111.		Areni	2210	AKM	1	
112.	13 November	Movses	0005	DSHK	8	
113.			1150	SVD	3	
114.			2335	AK	15	
115.				DSHK	5	
116.				PK	6	
117.		Sarigyugh	0030	PK	40	
118.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0045	AK	2	
119.			1150	PK	13	
120.		Paravaqar	0115	AKM	6	
121.			0130	AKM	6	
122.		Barcruni	0845	DSHK	20	
123.				PK	300	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
124.		Aygepar	0855	Black arrow	2	
125.			0955		1	
126.			1135	DSHK	17	
127.			1155	PK	8	
128.				DSHK	8	
129.			1635	SVD	2	
130.			1655		1	
131.			1705	Black arrow	3	
132.			1720		6	
133.			1725	PK	5	
134.			1801	SVD	5	
135.			1810	SVD	2	
136.				Black arrow	1	
137.			1935	PK	5	
138.		Chinari	1745	SVD	1	
139.				AK	8	
140.			2100	SVD	2	
141.		Vazashen	1825	AK	1	
142.				SVD	2	
143.		Aygedzor	2315	Black arrow	25	
144.				PK	50	
145.				AK	100	
146.	14 November	Aygepar	0640	DSHK	2	
147.			1525	AKM	2	
148.			1840	AKM	2	
149.		Movses	1045	DSHK	1	
150.			1200	SVD	1	
151.			1405	DSHK	5	
152.		Chinari	1205	Black arrow	3	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
153.		Berdavan	1250	AKM	4	
154.			1300	Black arrow	4	
155.			1330	PK	12	
156.		Vazashen	1300	SVD	1	
157.			1355	SVD	3	
158.		Yanshak	1300-1430	PK	55	
159.				DSHK	10	
160.		Tigranashen	1430	AK	15	
161.				PK	5	
162.			1534	AK	5	
163.		Lev	1715-1745	Black arrow	5	
164.				SVD	10	
165.		Kayanavan	1720	SVD	1	
166.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2315	SVD	1	
167.	15 November	Voskepar	0035	AKM	8	At 0845, near the village of Gyulistan at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Arman Tadevosyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
168.		Movses	0050	DSHK	7	
169.			1225	SVD	5	
170.			1530		7	
171.			1600	PK	6	
172.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0050	AKM	3	
173.			1225	NSVP	1	
174.		Yanshak	1050	Istiglal	2	
175.		Paravaqar	1220	Black arrow	5	
176.		Khachik	1430	PK	7	
177.		Aygepar	1520	AK	2	
178.		Berdavan	1710	PK	5	
179.				AK	10	
180.		Eraskh	1730	AK	2	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
181.		Dovegh	1815	Black arrow	3	
182.			2025	AK	2	
183.		Shaghat	1945	AK	5	
184.		Kayanvavan	2110		4	
185.		Aygedzor	2215	Black arrow	6	
186.				SVD	3	
187.	16 November	Aygepar	0520	SVD	1	
188.			1145		1	
189.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1430	SVD	1	
190.		Shaghat	1515-1545	PK	40	
191.		Barcravan	1540		10	
192.		Aygedzor	1545	Black arrow	3	
193.		Paravaqar	1640	PK	7	
194.		Lev	1700		40	
195.		Barekamavan	1715		10	
196.		Kayanavan	2015	AK	2	
197.		Sarigyugh	2115	PK	50	
198.				AK	20	
199.				RPK	20	
200.				SVD	8	
201.		Chinari	2200	SVD	6	
202.			2210	AKM	3	
203.	17 November	Chinari	0010	Black arrow	1	
204.		Aygedzor	0010	AKM	15	
205.			1215	SVD	3	
206.		N. Karmiraghbyur	0800	Black arrow	1	
207.			2200	AKM	3	
208.		Berqaber	2235	AKM	12	
209.			2300		6	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
210.	18 November	Berdavan	1500	Black arrow	2	At 1730, near the village of Verin Chaylu at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Hayk Hovsepyan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
211.		Aygepar	1630	AK	2	
212.		Vazashen	1625	AK	10	
213.		Aygedzor	1700	Black arrow	1	
214.		Kakhakn	1730	PK	100	
215.	19 November	N. Karmiraghbyur	0030	SVD	1	
216.			1230		2	
217.			1340	Black arrow	1	
218.			1345	SVD	2	
219.			1525	Black arrow	1	
220.		Chinari	0530	AK	30	
221.				PK	20	
222.				SVD	1	
223.			2055	SVD	2	
224.			2245	SVD	5	
225.		Movses	1015	AKM	10	
226.		Khachik	1140	AK	8	
227.		Barcravan	1400	PK	20	
228.		Berdavan	1458	AKM	1	
229.		Yanshak	1745	PK	40	
230.		Berqaber	2140	AKM	3	
231.		Aygedzor	2245	RPK	3	
232.		Eraskh	2205	AK	3	
233.	20 November	Movses	0400	SVD	1	
234.		Aygedzor	1220	RPG-7	13	
235.			1300		17	
236.		Chinari	1330	SVD	3	
237.			1740	PK	4	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
238.		Aygepar	1505	SVD	3	
239.		Yanshak	1840	PK	20	
240.	21 November	Mehrab	0645	Black arrow	5	At 1750, near the village of Horadiz at the borderline in the combat position, soldier Gegham Zaqaryan was wounded from the Azerbaijani side.
241.				SVD	10	
242.			1800	Black arrow	10	
243.				SVD	10	
244.				PK	20	
245.		Movses	1325	AKM	10	
246.		Tigranashen	1805	AK	2	
247.			1905		5	
248.			2120	AKM	4	
249.		Berdavan	2125	AKM	20	
250.		Aygepar	2325	PK	6	
251.	22 November	N. Karmiraghbyur	0005	PK	18	
252.			0035	SVD	3	
253.		Kayanavan	0050	AKM	4	
254.		Paravaqar	0225	AKM	1	
255.			2000	AK	20	
256.		Aygepar	0550	SVD	4	
257.			1650	AK	15	
258.				Black arrow	6	
259.		Tigranashen	0705	AK	3	
260.		Vazashen	1400	RPK	4	
261.		Chinari	1650	SVD	4	
262.		Sev Qar	2130	PK	2	
263.		Eraskh	2315	AK	10	
264.		Berqaber	2340	PK	15	
265.	23 November	Voskepar	0002	PK	10	
266.		Berqaber	0028	AK	2	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
267.			0445	AK	2	
268.			1110	AKM	3	
269.			2045	Black arrow	1	
270.			2150	PK	10	
271.		Movses	0815	AKM	3	
272.			1215	Black arrow	1	
273.			1715	DSHK	8	
274.		Chinari	1240	Black arrow	3	
275.		Aygepar	1320	SVD	2	
276.			1405	DSHK	8	
277.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1405	Black arrow	1	
278.		Aygedzor	2150	Black arrow	13	
279.		Vazashen	2340	PK	20	
280.				SVD	15	
281.	24 November	Baghanis	0010	AKM	60	
282.		Movses	0430	SVD	1	
283.			1000	AK	3	
284.			1840	SVD	1	
285.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1215	Black arrow	1	
286.		Barekamavan	1240	AKM	20	
287.		Aygepar	1525	Black arrow	1	
288.		Eraskh	1800	AKM	2	
289.		Chinari	1900	SVD	12	
290.			1910	AKM	7	
291.	25 November	Berqaber	0655	AK	3	
292.			1645	SVD	3	
293.		Aygepar	1540	Black arrow	1	
294.		Chinari	1740	AK	26	
295.				DSHK	5	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of violations
296.			2220	SVD	1	
297.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2110	AK	23	
298.	26 November	Eraskh	0005	AK	5	
299.			1315	AKM	2	
300.			1345		1	
301.			2225	AK	6	
302.		Berqaber	0045	PK	23	
303.			1005		3	
304.			1005	SVD	3	
305.			2130	PK	3	
306.		Mehrab	1120	Black arrow	3	
307.			1730	PK	5	
308.		Movses	1125	PK	6	
309.		Voskepar	1200	SVD	4	
310.		Kiranc	1255	AK	25	
311.		Lev	1305	Black arrow	7	
312.				SVD	10	
313.		Aygepar	1345	SVD	1	
314.			1640	DSHK	28	
315.			1710	DSHK	30	
316.		Berdavan	1650	PK	10	
317.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1730	Black arrow	12	
318.		Barcruni	1920	AKM	3	
319.		Kayanavan	2015	PK	4	
320.	27 November	Aygepar	0040	Black arrow	3	
321.			1100	Black arrow	1	
322.				DSHK	2	
323.			1440	DSHK	6	
324.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1100	DSHK	5	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
325.			1435	SVD	2	
326.			1710	DSHK	3	
327.			1805		2	
328.		Vazashen	1200	AKM	5	
329.			1220		15	
330.			1220		6	
331.		Kayanavan	1220	AKM	1	
332.		Chinari	1235	RPK	2	
333.		Yanshak	1345	Istiglal	4	
334.			1535		4	
335.		Vahan	1500	PK	14	
336.				SVD	3	
337.		Berqaber	1520	SVD	3	
338.	28 November	Movses	1000	SVD	1	
339.		Aygepar	1025	Black arrow	1	
340.			1040		3	
341.			1120	DSHK	5	
342.		Vazashen	1205	SVD	2	
343.			1500	PK	5	
344.				SVD	5	
345.				Black arrow	5	
346.				DSHK	6	
347.		Berqaber	1430	SVD	1	
348.				AKM	1	
349.			2230		7	
350.		Paravaqar	2345	AKM	5	
351.	29 November	Eraskh	0720	AK	1	
352.		Movses	0825		4	
353.			0915		1	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
354.		Aygepar	1230	Black arrow	2	
355.				SVD	2	
356.		Paravaqar	1240	AK	5	
357.		Khndzorut	1445		12	
358.		Berqaber	2005	SVD	1	
359.			2115	AK	5	
360.			2305		3	
361.	30 November	Vazashen	0140	PK	15	
362.		Berqaber	1255	SVD	2	
363.			1815	AKM	7	
364.		Chinari	1530	Black arrow	4	
365.		Eraskh	1550	AK	1	
366.			2220		1	
367.		Vazashen	1815		3	

United Nations A/69/719–S/2015/14

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
9 January 2015

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-ninth session
Agenda items 33 and 38

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Seventieth year

Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the dangerous situation in the front line due to the continued occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Republic of Armenia and its intensified ceasefire violations and increased attacks against the civilian population and civilian facilities.

On 3 January 2015, in particular, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia heavily shelled the defence positions of the Azerbaijani army with the deployment of heavy artillery, anti-tank grenade launchers and 60- and 82-millimetre mortars.

Over the past few days, in addition to the uninterrupted intense attacks on the positions of the Azerbaijani army, the Armenian armed forces launched a massive bombardment of Azerbaijani villages located behind the front line, using large-calibre weapons. Significant damage has been inflicted particularly on the villages of Chyragly and Horta Gervend in the Agdam district. The deliberate targeting and attacking of the civilian population and facilities raise serious concern.

The sole responsibility for the situation and its consequences lies with the Republic of Armenia, the aggressor and occupying State.

Armenia's unconstructiveness in the negotiations, its interest in maintaining the status quo, its refusal to comply with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, its policy of ruthless ethnic cleansing and its latest provocative actions aimed at undermining the peace process — all these provide the strongest grounds to impose substantial sanctions against Armenia by the international community. The continued presence of Armenia's armed forces on the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan remains the biggest threat to regional peace and security.

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To put an end to the decades-long occupation of the significant portion of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and sufferings of the Azerbaijani people, the United Nations must ensure the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Armenia's armed forces from all occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/69/720

General Assembly

Distr.: General
13 January 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 124
Global health and foreign policy

Letter dated 12 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly

The present letter on the work of the United Nations in the response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa covers developments from 1 November 2014 to 1 January 2015, the 90-day mark since the establishment of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). It contains information on activities carried out by my Special Envoy on Ebola and UNMEER, and provides an update on progress made in the Ebola response pursuant to General Assembly resolution 69/1 since my update of 12 November 2014 (A/69/573).

Current situation of the Ebola outbreak

As at 31 December 2014, a total of 20,206 confirmed, probable and suspected cases of Ebola had been reported in five affected countries (Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) and four previously affected countries (Nigeria, Senegal, Spain and the United States of America). One confirmed case was reported on 29 December in the United Kingdom. A total of 7,905 deaths have been reported.

In the three most affected countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone), significant progress has been made in slowing the spread of the disease. When the General Assembly passed its landmark resolution on 19 September 2014 welcoming my intention to establish UNMEER, the epidemic was spreading at an exponential rate, with new cases doubling every three to four weeks. More than 4,000 people were being infected with the disease each month, with more than half of cases resulting in death, overwhelming the response capacities of local health systems.

The situation with regard to the outbreak in the three most affected countries continues to stabilize, with the average number of newly recorded cases each week remaining at a comparable level since the beginning of October and decreasing slightly in December.

The total figures continue to mask significant differences, however, both among and within countries. The number of new cases reported is fluctuating in Guinea and decreasing in Liberia. In Sierra Leone, the western part of the country is experiencing the highest incidence of transmission, although there are signs that the

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increase has slowed. While the weekly numbers remain broadly similar, the disease is now more widely dispersed, creating significant challenges for the response.

The national trend in Guinea has been fluctuating since September and at present there is no discernible upward or downward trend in the country: 144 confirmed cases were reported in the week prior to 31 December, compared with 153 in the week prior to 1 December and 117 in the week prior to 1 November. In the week ending 24 December, Guinea reported 156 confirmed cases, the highest incidence of new cases since the outbreak began. This was largely due to a spike of 54 cases in Kissidougou prefecture, where the incidence of new cases then declined to 14 during the last week of December. The rate of transmission also remained high in the capital, Conakry, where 26 confirmed cases were reported in the week prior to 31 December. Other districts reporting high levels of transmission include Coyah, Forécariah, Macenta and N'zérékoré. The epicentre continues to be in the south-eastern region of Guinée forestière. At the same time, three districts that had previously reported Ebola cases did not report any confirmed or probable cases during that same week. As at 31 December, Guinea accounted for 2,797 cases and 1,709 deaths. Attempts to address the crisis in Guinea have sometimes been hampered by violent resistance to awareness-raising efforts and the continued use of unsafe practices in many remote areas of Guinée forestière region, which shares borders with Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

In Liberia, case incidence has been decreasing at the national level since mid-November. Thirty-one confirmed cases were reported in the week ending 31 December, in contrast with the rapid spread in mid-September, when more than 450 cases were recorded each week. On 31 December, for the first time in months no new case was recorded in Liberia. Montserrado county, which includes the capital, Monrovia, continues to be the area most affected by Ebola in the country, with 19 confirmed cases reported that week. New cases of transmission also continue to be reported in Grand Cape Mount county. Only two other counties reported cases that same week, while 11 counties did not report any cases. Lofa county, once the epicentre of the outbreak, reported no cases for the eighth consecutive week, highlighting the strength of response efforts in that district. As at 31 December, Liberia had reported a cumulative total of 8,018 cases and 3,423 deaths.

Sierra Leone is currently experiencing the highest rates of transmission of the three most affected countries, with 337 new confirmed cases reported in the week prior to 31 December. During the last week of November, Sierra Leone reported 537 new confirmed cases, accounting for more than 81 per cent of the 657 cases reported that week in all of the three most affected countries. Indeed, with more than 9,446 cases and 2,758 deaths, Sierra Leone now has the highest cumulative number of Ebola victims of all affected countries and has eclipsed overall caseloads in Liberia. Ebola transmission is most prevalent in the western and northern districts of Sierra Leone, but there are signs that the increase in incidence has recently begun to slow down. In the week prior to 31 December, the capital, Freetown, accounted for 44 per cent of the country's new confirmed cases (149), the highest case incidence reported since the start of the outbreak.

On 17 December, the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations system, through UNMEER, initiated the "Western Area surge", an operation aimed at intensifying efforts to curb the disease in the western parts of the country,

including Freetown. This targeted surge is expected to bring about an eventual decline in caseloads, even as the number of recorded cases increases as a result of more robust surveillance. Transmission also continues at a high rate in the district of Kono in the east of the country. Districts such as Bo and Tonkolili, however, have seen caseloads decline in recent weeks. Four districts in the country's south and east did not report any new confirmed cases: Bonthe, Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun.

The recent outbreak of Ebola in Mali provided a stark reminder of the cross-border threat posed by the disease. Mali has seen two index cases of Ebola since 23 October. At the request of the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, UNMEER established an office in Bamako to support the Government in containing the Ebola outbreak and bolstering its preparedness. The office, which became operational on 26 November, was led by Dr. Ibrahima Socé Fall of Senegal as its Ebola Crisis Manager for an initial period of two months.

While the first case of Ebola, which was reported on 23 October, did not result in a chain of transmission, a second case, reported on 11 November in Bamako, resulted in six additional cases. Of the eight cases recorded in Mali, six resulted in deaths (including of two health-care workers). On 15 December, Mali marked the end of the 21-day surveillance period for all remaining contacts in the chain of transmission. No further cases have been recorded. The experience shows that the efforts made by the Government since May 2014 to strengthen preparedness have paid off. I would like to congratulate the Government of Mali on this achievement, which highlights the importance of preparedness. When the first case was reported in Mali, the Government diligently implemented the needed response measures and ensured a rapid and robust response, putting in place an emergency operations centre and appointing an Ebola response coordinator with a direct reporting line to the President. The successful containment of these Ebola cases in Mali also benefited from significant efforts on the part of a range of United Nations system entities, under the leadership of the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNMEER.

Health-care workers continue to face an acute risk of contracting Ebola. By the end of the reporting period, 678 health-care workers had been infected with Ebola, of whom 380 have died. Liberia accounts for the highest number of cumulative cases, with 369 cases in total, while Sierra Leone has reported 143 cases and Guinea 148. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the numbers of new infections have, however, declined from their peaks, in spite of the high caseload in Sierra Leone. Infections among health-care workers continue to be of concern, particularly in Guinea, where seven new infections were reported in the week prior to 21 December. Many of these health-care workers contracted Ebola in non-Ebola health facilities, highlighting the importance of strengthening the capacity of regular health systems to control and prevent infection as part of an integrated approach to end Ebola.

As at 31 December, seven confirmed cases of Ebola were reported among United Nations personnel and four among the members of the immediate families of United Nations personnel. There have been five confirmed deaths. Through the generous assistance of Member States and through arrangements with commercial partners, the availability of appropriate Ebola and non-Ebola health-care services and a sustainable medical evacuation process for United Nations, humanitarian and related personnel serving in the affected countries has been ensured.

There remain persistent challenges with regard to the data collection process and the quality of epidemiological data owing to the inaccessibility of remote areas, the unreliability of reported data and perceived underreporting due to the resistance of some communities, notably in Guinea. These challenges are particularly prevalent at the district level. More accurate and timely data is needed to understand the evolution of the epidemic, evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and allocate limited resources effectively. UNMEER is working with key agencies involved in data collection, including Médecins sans frontières (MSF), WHO and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, to address this challenge through the development of a unified, technology-based reporting system. The deployment of additional information management officers and the training of data managers to support this system will result in progressively more accurate data.

While the overall slowdown in the spread of Ebola in the region is a welcome development, the situation between and within the countries remains variable and the total number of new cases remains high and distributed widely across many districts in the three countries.

Current progress with regard to the operational framework to stop the Ebola outbreak

Overall assessment

Significant progress has been made with regard to the operational framework to stop the Ebola outbreak, which was established at a multi-stakeholder conference convened by UNMEER in October. This operational framework identified four key lines of action: (a) case finding through surveillance, laboratory services and contact tracing; (b) case management in Ebola treatment units and community care centres; (c) safe and dignified burials; and (d) social mobilization and community engagement. Through the implementation of these four lines of action, the concerted efforts of the United Nations system and its partners are contributing to stopping the spread of Ebola in the three most affected countries.

It is also important to recognize that the progress in slowing transmission rates achieved to date is, in great measure, due to the efforts of affected communities. These communities have changed their behaviours and adjusted traditional practices that increased the likelihood of virus transmission, such as the washing of bodies of the deceased prior to burial. In most cases, these behavioural changes were the result of appropriate social mobilization and community awareness-raising efforts made under the proactive leadership of the national Government. While awareness-raising efforts need to be markedly strengthened in several regions, particularly in rural Guinea and in the western districts of Sierra Leone (including Freetown), there are many promising signs of progress.

International efforts have also played a key part in reducing the spread of Ebola. By supporting the establishment of treatment centres and safe and dignified burial teams and by training thousands of contact tracers and social mobilizers, the response has contributed significantly to a reduction in the spread of Ebola, saved hundreds of lives through earlier and better treatment for the sick and prevented higher rates of transmission.

Through the collective efforts of national Governments, affected communities and the United Nations system and its partners, all countries have made significant

progress in the key lines of action, including in case finding and contact tracing, isolation and treatment, safe burials and social mobilization.

Progress towards meeting key targets

While it is difficult to provide exact figures given that not all Ebola-related deaths are reported, at this point it is estimated that over 90 per cent of individuals reported to have died from Ebola receive a safe and dignified burial. Out of precaution, safe burial practices have also been applied to many deaths not clearly attributable to Ebola. Currently, 221 trained safe burial teams are in place and an increase in the number of such teams is planned to provide adequate capacities to ensure safe burials for expected future caseloads. Despite the overall progress, there are still regions where safe burials are not carried out. Improved geographical coverage and greater mobility of safe burial teams are needed. In addition, portions of the population remain sceptical about safe and dignified burials, which leads them to carry out clandestine, unsafe burials. It has been reported that in some households the body of the deceased was washed before the safe burial team was called.

By the 60-day mark, the target of isolating and treating 70 per cent of people with Ebola was achieved in Guinea and Liberia, as well as in many but not all districts of Sierra Leone. In Guinea and Liberia, the rapid build-up of Ebola treatment units and community care centres has been reinforced by community-based initiatives to encourage the self-isolation of individuals identified as having been infected with the virus, resulting in the isolation and treatment of more than 70 per cent of all such individuals.

In Sierra Leone, at the 60-day mark, this target had not been achieved in four districts (Western Area Urban, Western Area Rural, Port Loko and Bombali) where transmission rates continue to be high owing, in large measure, to the shortage of adequate treatment facilities. During a visit to Sierra Leone from 30 November to 2 December, my Special Representative and my Special Envoy met with the President, Ernest Bai Koroma, to discuss solutions to curbing the high rate of transmission in the western and northern areas of Sierra Leone.

The Government of Sierra Leone developed a "Western Area surge" plan with the active support of the United Nations system, through UNMEER, and its partners. On 3 December, the United Nations deployed an emergency surge team to support the National Ebola Response Centre of Sierra Leone in the implementation phase. The operation, which was launched on 17 December, sought to contain the rapid spread of the virus by increasing bed capacity and enhancing support for the achievement of the lines of action. UNMEER mobilized operational partners to provide the capacities to meet critical gaps, such as beds and convalescent centres, and facilitated the transport of additional laboratories from within the region, the airlifting of blood samples and the deployment of laboratory data specialists.

Taking stock at the 90-day mark, the objective was to isolate 100 per cent of all Ebola patients and ensure safe and dignified burials in 100 per cent of Ebola-related deaths. Many affected districts have reached the goals set out by the key performance indicators, while others are still on track to achieving them. All three countries have sufficient net capacity to isolate and treat 100 per cent of confirmed Ebola patients. The aggregate availability of Ebola treatment unit beds exceeds the numbers of reported Ebola patients. Guinea reports an overall availability of

1.9 beds per Ebola patient, Liberia 13.9 and Sierra Leone 3.6. Similarly, there are enough burial teams in place to ensure safe and dignified burials in 100 per cent of all deaths due to Ebola. The reality is, however, that there are still patients with Ebola who do not receive treatment and there are still people who die from Ebola who do not receive a safe and dignified burial.

The capacity to isolate Ebola patients is not uniform across the districts and regions of each country, causing continuing shortages in several districts. Putting in place this capacity takes time, while the disease can quickly spread to new areas. Some affected districts therefore may have more Ebola treatment units or community care centre beds than patients, while, in others, the number of locally available treatment beds is insufficient. Steps are being taken to address these discrepancies, for example by making new beds available in underserved areas and redistributing beds from well-served ones.

An increase in laboratories, from 17 to 23, was reported in the three countries, with 4 of the laboratories being located in Guinea, 8 in Liberia and 11 in Sierra Leone. From any affected district, the nearest laboratory can now be accessed within 24 hours. As at 28 December, the daily testing capacity also increased to a total of 1,700 samples, including 190 in Guinea, 760 in Liberia and 750 in Sierra Leone.

The number of beds in Ebola treatment units remained relatively stable in Guinea and Liberia in December, while it increased dramatically in Sierra Leone, especially in the Western Area. The number of operational community care centres also increased in the three countries, from 22 by the end of November to 4_ at the end of the reporting period (33 in Sierra Leone and 9 in Liberia); many more such centres are expected to become operational in the coming weeks.

In Guinea, five Ebola treatment units are currently operational, providing 265 beds. A new Ebola treatment unit in Coyah that opened on 30 December will progressively augment its capacity from 15 to 100 beds. The planned construction of 62 community care centres is under way.

In Liberia, 13 Ebola treatment units are currently operational, providing a capacity of 660 beds. That number represents a decrease from 790 at the end of November and is due to the closure of an Ebola treatment unit in Lofa county and the scaling down of other units in line with the decline in new cases. By late December, it was estimated that only 12 per cent of Ebola treatment beds were occupied. Liberia has 103 beds in its community care centres.

Sierra Leone has experienced the greatest increase in bed capacity, with 19 Ebola treatment units operational by the end of December providing a capacity of 896 beds, in addition to the 291 community care centre beds. This capacity almost doubled during December as a result of the Western Area surge; in the Western Area alone there are 620 beds.

There has been continued progress in the area of safe burials as well. By the end of the reporting period 254 burial teams were operational, of which 63 were in Guinea (100 per cent of the target), 89 in Liberia (89 per cent of the target) and 101 in Sierra Leone (89 per cent of the target). In total, it is estimated that approximately 95 per cent of all reported dead bodies are collected within 24 hours for a safe and dignified burial in Liberia and Sierra Leone, while the corresponding estimate for Guinea is 88 per cent.

There has also been considerable progress in social mobilization and community engagement during the reporting period. More than 150 social mobilization groups, comprised of international and national non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations and community-based organizations, are active in the social mobilization pillar, which is co-chaired by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Ministry of Health in each country. According to UNICEF, in Guinea 1,465 of the planned 2,935 community watch committees have been established in all 18 Ebola-affected prefectures. Forty-seven communities in Guinea were targeted for awareness-raising efforts in December. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the percentage of districts where safe burial is promoted by religious and community leaders has reached 100 per cent, while in Guinea it is 72 per cent. Overall, more than 100,000 teachers, religious leaders, traditional chiefs and community watch committee members have received Ebola training in the three countries so that they can raise awareness among their communities.

Challenges to achieving key response targets

A number of challenges must be addressed in order to move forward and ensure that the global response continues to achieve progress in meeting the more ambitious targets.

It is crucial for the response to remain nimble and flexible in adapting to the shifting pattern of the outbreak. As the intensity of the outbreak diminishes but the geographic spread increases, response capabilities must be adapted accordingly. In the current phase of the response, a district-by-district approach to the outbreak has been adopted to enable the effective isolation, diagnosis and treatment of those infected with Ebola, as well as capabilities for disease surveillance, namely community engagement, case-finding and contact tracing. Facilitating the full roll-out of the district-by-district approach will allow for a more calibrated response, one that is tailored to exigencies on the ground and that will make it possible to detect new cases and outbreaks early and respond quickly.

The continuing resistance of some communities to engaging fully in effective preventive measures to stop the transmission of Ebola needs to be addressed. In areas of community resistance, underreporting of deaths, unsafe burials, late reporting and lack of isolation continue to be the main factors driving transmission. These factors still pose significant challenges in some parts of Liberia and in the Western Area of Sierra Leone, as well as in some rural areas of Guinea, where the number of prefectures reporting instances where communities have resisted help from responders increased from 16 in October to 22 by the end of December; in several instances, communities incited violence against responders. Moreover, as a reduction in Ebola incidence is documented in some areas, communities may become complacent in adhering to preventive measures. The response is seeking to address this challenge through increased and improved community engagement, including by enlisting the support of local community leaders and elders. There is also a need to ensure that community awareness-raising efforts continue, even in districts with few or no new infections, to combat complacency and prevent any flare-ups.

Sufficient numbers of trained and experienced international medical responders with the requisite language skills to support national personnel in responding to a large number of widely dispersed disease outbreaks must be

ensured. To respond to the increasing geographical dispersion of the outbreak, it is necessary to establish a large number of basic and more flexibly deployable treatment and surveillance capabilities at the district level.

There is still a need to make the response, including our rapid response capabilities, more mobile, so as to be able to reach Ebola-affected individuals in remote villages. Increased donations of locally adapted vehicles, including motorcycles, increase the mobility of contact tracers and those transporting laboratory samples so that they can reach their destinations. To support the need for rapid response capabilities in strategic locations, like the capitals, to then deploy quickly to remote locations to contain localized outbreaks, the rapid isolation and treatment of Ebola approach was operationalized in December in Liberia. UNMEER and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service are working together to provide aviation support to equip those implementing the approach with the required mobility.

Update on the operational activities carried out by the United Nations system, through the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, and its partners

The Ebola emergency has galvanized a massive global response to assist the efforts of the national Governments of the three most affected countries. An unprecedented number of international entities have provided financial, operational and medical support.

During my recent visit to the region from 18 to 20 December, I was privileged to witness the global response effort. I travelled the region in solidarity with the Governments and the people of the affected countries and conveyed my strong support to the many courageous response workers on the front lines.

United Nations partners

Operational efforts are being carried out by a broad coalition of responders, including Governments, civil society actors, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and national and international non-governmental organizations, which are managing the Ebola treatment units and fighting Ebola on the front lines.

MSF alone operates seven Ebola treatment units in the three countries. In October, it began distributing anti-malarial drugs in Monrovia, with plans to reach 300,000 people over the next three months. MSF has similar plans for Freetown. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has trained and deployed hundreds of teams to carry out safe and dignified burials, which has been critical in reducing the transmission of the virus. Many other non-governmental organizations are providing support in key areas, including communications systems, food assistance and mapping.

Efforts to increase treatment capacity have been greatly assisted by the deployment of international medical responders. This broad coalition of responders includes African medical personnel made available to national Governments through the African Union Support to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. Since it was launched in September, the African Union has deployed hundreds of health experts to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. By the end of the reporting period, the African Union had initiated the deployment of 550 personnel, including 81 from the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 187 from Ethiopia and 196 from Nigeria, to serve as epidemiologists and health-care and clinical workers. One Ebola treatment unit in Liberia (Congo Town) and one in Sierra Leone (Bombali) are already run by African Union experts, in conjunction with the national ministries of health. I would like to commend the African Union for the deployment of skilled volunteers under the African Union Support to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa.

The West African Health Association deployed personnel to support Ebola facilities in Guinea and Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has identified hundreds of African doctors for training and deployment to the affected countries. Meanwhile, the Mano River Union is supporting cross-border cooperation in the response.

The response is also being supported by foreign medical teams from Australia, China, Cuba, Germany, Kenya, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden and Uganda, as well as by national and foreign defence forces, particularly from France, the United States and the United Kingdom, which have played critical enabling roles in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, respectively. The coordination of military efforts with civilian-led activities is ensured by UNMEER civil-military liaison officers and fully integrated into the national and UNMEER coordination mechanisms.

The private sector has also mobilized to provide support to the Ebola response. Companies in the affected countries, primarily from the mining sector, have provided equipment and warehouse space. The commitment of some companies to continue operations during the Ebola outbreak has helped preserve hundreds of thousands of jobs, as well as prospects for economic recovery. Transport industry companies have supported the international delivery of assistance through free air and sea transportation services, as well as advocacy against harmful air travel restrictions. The information technology sector has contributed data analysis services to responders and donated mobile phones to support epidemiological data collection and to help Ebola patients keep in touch with their families. The African Union Commission, in collaboration with mobile telecommunications operators and others, has launched an SMS campaign to mobilize resources in support of the operations of the African Union Support to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa. Pharmaceutical companies have provided personal protective equipment and medical supplies to responders and are working on the development and trials of vaccines in partnership with WHO. Private sector organizations have established an Ebola private sector mobilization group to better coordinate their contributions to the response in West Africa, with a commitment to ensure the safety of their employees and to provide a lifeline for continued economic activity.

United Nations system

In the three most affected countries, UNMEER supports national Ebola response plans and seeks to ensure that all responses are coherent and effective. Reporting directly to me, UNMEER works in close collaboration with the national Governments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to align all entities involved in the response on a commonly agreed operational framework under the leadership of the host Government. It provides assistance to the Governments in managing the crisis response both at the national and the district levels, and identifies challenges and response gaps, directing resources to fill them.

Its regional mandate also allows UNMEER to take a broader view of the outbreak and the required response efforts, including by supporting cross-border collaboration and redeploying assets across borders as needed.

UNMEER has provided support to the host Governments for the operationalization of national crisis management structures, including through the deployment of staff to support the National Ebola Response Cell in Guinea, staffing and communications support to the National Ebola Response Centre in Sierra Leone, planning support to the incident management system in Liberia, and the roll-out of the response's district-by-district approach, including through support to identify the needs and gaps at the district level in line with national plans. UNMEER has also facilitated the transport of national health officials and responders to districts of concern and facilitated the transport of rapid response supplies and blood samples to laboratories. Together with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, UNMEER has facilitated the deployment of the rapid isolation and treatment of Ebola teams.

UNMEER has worked to strengthen cross-border cooperation in the prevention and control of Ebola, including through the organization of a technical meeting on 9 December hosted by the Government of Liberia on this subject. The meeting was attended by government delegations from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Nigeria, representatives from the Mano River Union, the African Union and ECOWAS, and United Nations and international partners. Participants agreed on the need for a regional, rather than multi-country, approach to the response. The subsequent transfer of the European Union-sponsored testing laboratory from Liberia (Foya, Lofa county) to Sierra Leone (Freetown) provided a concrete example of cross-border collaboration resulting from the meeting. Additionally, UNMEER has facilitated meetings between delegations from affected countries, such as Guinea and Mali, on cross-border issues.

UNMEER has also mobilized significant logistical and human resources to facilitate the response. It has established operational offices in four countries and headquarters in a fifth. An UNMEER liaison capacity is being established in Dakar to support coordination with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on the restoration of essential services and to plan for early recovery. As at 31 December, 211 staff and personnel with specific crisis coordination and other relevant experience had been deployed, including 126 (59 per cent) in the affected countries. That included 21 field crisis managers stationed at the district level to support response coordination; UNMEER is also facilitating the installation of mobile data collectors to support them.

To ensure the prompt mobilization of vetted coordination experts, UNMEER also leveraged the surge mechanisms of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. To help national Governments and UNMEER establish coordination structures, the Office also deployed United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination teams to UNMEER headquarters in Ghana, to Liberia and to Mali.

To date, 176 organizations are operating emergency programmes across the three countries most affected by Ebola. In Liberia, the eight humanitarian clusters, which are all co-chaired by a government counterpart and have reporting lines to the Resident Coordinator and to UNMEER, have allowed for a particularly integrative approach to the response. Humanitarian clusters were activated for the coordination

of logistics; health, including nutrition; water, sanitation and hygiene; food security; protection, including child protection; early recovery; and education. The health and logistics clusters are also integrated into the UNMEER operational framework. In addition, an inter-cluster coordination mechanism was established.

WHO has continued to undertake training for substantial numbers of health-care personnel and communities, including 160 national epidemiologists, 84 Guinean Red Cross officers and 400 village committee members in Guinea; 1,500 health-care workers, 800 social mobilization volunteers in Montserrado and 20 women's community groups in Liberia; and 722 health-care workers in Sierra Leone. In Guinea and Liberia, WHO has deployed infection prevention and control specialist teams to train health-care workers in the use of personal protective equipment; develop plans to undertake facility evaluations; investigate health-care worker infections; and implement infection prevention and control assessment tools in Ebola facilities. In Sierra Leone, WHO conducted infection prevention and control assessments at 34 Ebola treatment facilities.

WFP is providing a common services platform for the Ebola response that includes aviation, the building of treatment centres, "last-mile" transportation and logistics coordination. Its extensive logistics network for the response in all three countries includes a main logistics base, 11 forward logistics bases, three staging areas, three main hubs and three regional staging areas to provide intermediate storage facilities for more than 40 implementing partners. WFP has also managed the construction of eight Ebola treatment units in Guinea and Liberia, including the new Ebola treatment unit in Coyah, Guinea, which opened on 30 December. Since the onset of Ebola response operations, the logistics cluster has transported 5,186 tons of humanitarian supplies and more than 22,000 cubic metres of cargo on behalf of more than 25 partners to Ebola health-care facilities and warehouses. The air coordination cell in Copenhagen, put in place by the logistics cluster and jointly overseen by WFP and UNICEF, has not only carried out regional strategic airlifts but also coordinated 95 inter-agency and fully funded flights carrying 4,548 tons of cargo for partners to the affected countries since September. In December alone, at least 742 tons were flown into the West African region on 30 flights, including strategic and regional airlifts.

Personnel from the United Nations Mission in Liberia have provided logistics and engineering support to the response in that country. Meanwhile, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali supported the response by contributing personnel, logistics and material assistance to the national coordination structure and provided support for the Government's tracking exercise.

UNICEF, in partnership with Governments, civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations, significantly scaled up its efforts to establish community care centres, which provide basic supportive care, testing and a range of prevention services. UNICEF has also reached more than 2 million people with awareness-raising messaging, is supporting national authorities by establishing protocols to facilitate school reopenings and providing technical assistance for remote schooling options such as radio education, and has provided more than 1,800 children with child protection services.

UNICEF has, in partnership with Governments, community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations, significantly scaled up its efforts to establish community care centres, engage communities through social

mobilization, ensure child protection, provide critical water, sanitation and hygiene services and to procure key critical commodities such as personal protective equipment. UNICEF also supports the maintenance and strengthening of non-Ebola health-care and education services, including radio education. For example, in Sierra Leone, 36 community care centres are now functional and in Liberia 10 rapid isolation and treatment of Ebola teams are fully equipped. In Guinea, 1,290 village watch committees are engaging in social mobilization and more than 200 cars and 700 motorcycles are being used in support of contact tracing, the transportation of patients and blood samples and safe burials. In Liberia, UNICEF has helped a network of district social mobilizers engage 175,000 households through house-to-house visits and town hall meetings on prevention practices, rapid reporting, isolation of the infected and addressing stigma. In Sierra Leone, more than 4,300 health-care workers and 2,600 support staff received training in infection prevention and control. The UNICEF supply division delivered more than 4,000 tons of supplies in support of all critical services.

Under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cash payment scheme for Ebola care workers, which is helping to ensure uninterrupted health services, case tracing and safe burials, over 97 per cent of registered Ebola workers are linked to payment mechanisms and 90 per cent of registered Ebola workers have been paid on time. With UNDP support, the United Nations was able to facilitate two payments by the Government in Sierra Leone, on 14 November and 5 December, which resulted in the payment of more than 14,000 Ebola workers per payout. UNDP is providing technical support to national Governments in the design and implementation of the payment systems.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has continued to train contact tracers in Sierra Leone. In December, 1,803 contact tracers were trained in partnership with the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, bringing the total number of trained contact tracers to 5,030. UNFPA also worked with the ministries of health of the States members of the Mano River Union to develop a midwifery project aimed at providing reproductive, maternal and infant health services. More than 500 midwives, doctors and support staff are currently being recruited in the framework of the project, to open and equip at least 20 midwifery facilities in each of the three most affected countries.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, together with the Guinean authorities and partners, has organized a series of events in Conakry and Nzérékoré on human rights perspectives in the Ebola outbreak.

The World Bank and the African Development Bank have provided significant support to national government efforts to stop Ebola transmission and treat infected individuals, including funds for different United Nations system entities that provide support to Governments for a system to bring international medical responders to the region and for support to national budgets so that Governments can continue to provide essential services in a range of sectors.

Activities of the Special Envoy on Ebola and the Global Ebola Response Coalition

Following extensive engagement at the global level in October and November on behalf of the Governments of the three most affected countries, my Special Envoy on Ebola returned to the region from 25 November to 3 December. He visited

UNMEER headquarters in Accra and met with national Governments and response partners in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mali. In all four affected countries, my Special Envoy noted strong political engagement at the highest level, as well as functioning robust coordination mechanisms.

The Global Ebola Response Coalition, chaired by my Special Envoy, continues to serve a convening and information-sharing role between actors in the response both in the affected countries and in capitals around the world. The Coalition continues to expand with the objective of ensuring that a well-connected network of partners can continue to collectively identify bottlenecks and develop new global strategies under the leadership of national Governments.

At my request, my Special Envoy has also spearheaded the establishment of a global information centre on Ebola. The centre, based at United Nations Headquarters, brings together communications experts from across the United Nations system with partners from the private sector to develop clear and robust messages on the Ebola outbreak. The centre will develop messaging and a proactive strategy to engage media and other communications partners and it will work closely with the Governments of the affected countries to catalyse greater global support for their efforts.

My Special Envoy will continue to lead efforts within the Coalition, in coordination with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Bank, the European Union and the international campaigning and advocacy organization ONE, to increase clarity on funding requirements and disbursements related to the response by continuing to report up-to-date information. As at 31 December, the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund had total pledges and deposits amounting to $141 million. Between 1 November and 1 January, it disbursed over $105.5 million to address critical unfunded gaps in the three most affected countries. The largest disbursement, of $34 million, was made to fund WFP logistics operations, while other disbursements have been made to fund epidemiological surveillance in the three most affected countries, to support 10 community care centres in Guinea, to protect Ebola-affected children in Liberia and to provide support to NERC and the rapid response and stabilization teams in Sierra Leone, among other priorities.

In an effort to create further transparency and greater clarity on gaps and resourcing needs, I asked my Special Envoy to publish a "resources-for-results" report on 22 December. The report provided a thorough overview of affected countries' needs, as highlighted by Governments, including available resources, disbursements to date and remaining gaps. Country-tailored reports were made available to the Governments of the three most affected countries; the reports provided specific figures in terms of available resources allocated by the major United Nations entities as well as funds disbursed, mapped against countries' estimated and projected needs.

The Coalition will also continue its efforts to ensure that early recovery and revival efforts are fully integrated into the Ebola response. This will involve supporting the development of a unified risk, recovery and revival agenda across health systems, economies and societies across West Africa. Recovery efforts will be led from within countries with country-specific agendas, with the Coalition helping to ensure a smooth transition from the Ebola response to post-Ebola revival.

Moving forward

The success of the global Ebola response also depends on those activities that fall outside of the UNMEER operational framework but within the purview of the mandates of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes as part of the broader strategy designed by my Special Envoy on Ebola. For example, in addition to activities aimed at stopping the outbreak and treating the infected, the broader strategy includes providing essential services, preserving stability and preventing outbreaks in non-affected countries. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and their partners have been coordinating efforts to begin to address the cross-sectoral impacts of the outbreak under the leadership of the Resident Coordinators in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Stopping the outbreak and treating the infected

To contain the Ebola outbreak, it is necessary to further tailor the response in terms of the location and spread pattern of the disease. The initial emphasis was on containing the spread by finding and isolating infected individuals in the epicentres of the outbreak; now, it has shifted to eliminating transmission of the virus wherever it appears, including through greater focus on contact tracing and surveillance. As smaller, more localized outbreaks of Ebola appear across a broader geographical area, the response must adapt correspondingly from a country-level to a district-level approach. With this in mind, Governments, partners and the United Nations system are focusing on tailored responses in each of the 62 districts of the three most affected countries (33 districts in Guinea, 15 districts in Liberia and 14 districts in Sierra Leone).

In a district-by-district approach, districts are categorized according to two criteria: the nature of the transmission and the nature of the district. The intensity of the transmission (high, low or none) is the primary determinant of which lines of action become the focus of the response, but the scale and tactics used to operationalize the response are also influenced by the geographic nature of the district (urban, rural or border). An analysis of each district based on these criteria allows for the responses to be tailored to the needs so as to maximize the effectiveness of the interventions and the efficiency with which resources are allocated.

In districts with high rates of transmission, the response will focus on treatment capacity and safe burials, while in districts with no cases the focus will be on surveillance measures. Urban and rural areas differ in terms of the types of treatment facilities available and the number of teams needed. Border districts, especially districts bordering non-affected countries, require special measures, including for the prevention of the cross-border spread of the disease through strong surveillance and for ensuring cross-border cooperation, information-sharing and resource mobilization.

The district-by-district approach will be complemented by a rapid response capacity that can be deployed in cases of sudden flare-ups of the disease that are beyond the capacities in place at the district level.

The district-by-district approach will also require ensuring that surveillance and contact-tracing capacities are present in all districts, including those with no current cases, to allow for early responses to new outbreaks, preventing the disease

from spreading, using fewer resources than would be required if the response were delayed. The district-level approach will also build basic capacity for monitoring of infectious diseases, a capacity that will form part of the UNMEER exit strategy and will need to outlast Ebola and the current response.

Reflective of this district-level approach, the United Nations system, through UNMEER, is increasing its focus on ensuring that all persons newly infected with Ebola come from lists of known Ebola contacts. This indicator provides a key measure of the level of control achieved over the spread of the disease.

With the support of the United Nations system, through UNMEER, and its partners, national Governments in the three most affected countries have made preliminary progress in rolling out the district-by-district approach. On 20 December, NERC convened all district coordinators and district medical officers in Sierra Leone to prepare district response plans that will form the basis of a consolidated needs document to appeal for donor support. In Guinea, the United Nations system, through UNMEER, has supported the Government's strategy to decentralize coordination of the response to the prefecture level, with the appointment of a prefectural coordinator in each of the country's 18 affected prefectures. UNMEER field crisis managers have been deployed to six field locations, covering 11 of these prefectures. In Liberia, meanwhile, UNMEER field crisis managers help to facilitate the activities of county health teams on the ground.

Providing essential services and preserving stability

Taking note of the impact that the Ebola outbreak has had on essential services in the affected countries, I have requested my Special Envoy on Ebola to assume a leadership role in ensuring that the immediate and safe provision of essential services receives the necessary attention as part of the integrated Ebola response. In each of the affected countries, UNMEER and the Resident Coordinators will ensure that this immediate response is guided by national priorities, underpinned by a support strategy and implemented in a coordinated manner. To present an up-to-date overarching regional strategic framework for the immediate response, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, together with my Special Envoy and WHO, is leading a revision of the overview of needs and requirements for the Ebola response that will be published in mid-January 2015. This strategic review will also pave the way for a reflection on how to ensure a seamless transition from the immediate response to the post-crisis recovery phase.

At the same time, to strengthen the operational link between UNMEER and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes involved in the restoration of essential services and early recovery, UNMEER has established a liaison office in Dakar to facilitate co-location with the regional offices of most United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. I am grateful to the Government of Senegal for its agreement to host this office.

Non-Ebola health care

Fear of transmission, shortages of health-care workers and a lack of available personal protective equipment and triage mechanisms to ensure infection prevention and control have had a devastating impact on the availability of non-Ebola health-care facilities. In Liberia, the Ministry of Health estimates that less than 45 per cent of public health-care facilities were functional as at the end of the reporting period.

Cases of malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis and typhoid often go untreated and HIV/AIDS treatments and maternal health options have been rendered unavailable. Maternal health requires special attention: UNFPA reports that in 2015 some 100,000 births in the affected countries are expected to entail life-threatening complications. Since May, the Ebola outbreak has also disrupted regular vaccination programmes owing to concerns over convening crowds.

Apart from the urgency of strengthening non-Ebola health-care facilities to address routine needs, ending the Ebola outbreak will also depend on strengthened health systems in the affected countries to facilitate the early detection of cases through strong disease surveillance. It will become vital to ensure that non-Ebola health-care facilities are capable of providing basic health services, while protecting health-care workers and patients against Ebola infection. The safe reopening of health-care clinics also means that patients who may possibly be infected with Ebola can safely seek treatment in their own communities, thus reducing the risk of the spreading the disease to unaffected areas.

To encourage clinics to reopen and accept patients, WHO has developed a set of "no-touch" guidelines for community health workers operating in small clinics. MSF has also started establishing triage facilities in Monrovia to enable the safe resumption of basic health-care service provision. The three most affected countries have a health sector redevelopment plan in place. In Liberia, WHO, together with partners, is supporting the Government in undertaking a review of the impact of the Ebola outbreak on its health services with the intent of accelerating the restoration of essential services while building a more resilient health-care system.

Protection

UNICEF has provided more than 25,000 children with child protection services, supported the establishment of interim care centres to support children who have come into contact with Ebola, provided psychosocial support in and out of treatment units, as well as family tracing and reunification and interim or alternative care, including cash support to caregivers and Ebola survivors.

Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration has developed a strategy to support the provision of migrant-friendly prevention, psychosocial and care services to migrant communities, in particular in remote and border areas, in view of the population displacement induced by the epidemic.

Education

An estimated 10,000 schools remain closed in the three most affected countries, preventing some 5 million children aged between 3 and 17 years from obtaining much-needed knowledge and skills. Ministries of education in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have been eager to see schools reopened as a way to reassure communities and create a sense of stability. In order to ensure that schools can function as safe and protective spaces for learning, however, appropriate protocols must first be established and adequate infection, prevention and control measures put in place. If this is done, measures to support the restoration of education can complement ongoing efforts to stop the Ebola outbreak. For example, schools can serve as an important enabler of community awareness-raising, contact tracing and monitoring.

While schools remain closed, UNICEF and other education partners are supporting the roll-out of the response plans of the ministries of education in each of the three most affected countries. Teachers are being trained in community social mobilization efforts to help stop the spread of the virus. Distance and self-directed learning programmes, including radio education, are helping to ensure continuity of learning at the national level. Alternative education programmes will continue once schools have reopened to reach out-of-school and the most disadvantaged children in the countries.

Food security

According to a recent study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and its partners, travel, movement and grouping restrictions along with border closures have had a significant, negative impact on food security and nutrition by lowering food production, food availability and food access, disrupting markets and cross-border trade, decreasing agriculture farm-gate prices and lowering household incomes and purchasing power in the most affected countries.

Since August, WFP and its partners have provided food assistance to nearly 1.9 million people living in the most affected areas of high transmission countries. Food security assessments have been carried out in the three most affected countries by FAO, WFP and Action contre la faim.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

UNICEF, WHO and their implementing partners are providing water, sanitation and hygiene support in two main areas. First, in the health sector, water, sanitation and hygiene interventions are being scaled up to stop virus transmission by ensuring that water is available in quarantine sites, treatment units and referral centres, and that adequate sanitation and hygiene measures are being implemented at these locations, as well as in affected households. To date, an estimated 86 per cent of Ebola treatment units and community care centres in the three most affected countries have functional water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. Second, at the community level, water, sanitation and hygiene interventions contribute to preventing the further spread of the disease and reducing the risk of such spread by ensuring that the population has access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene commodities. For example, UNICEF provided more than 160,000 households with water, sanitation and hygiene kits and support.

Economic impact, livelihoods and early recovery planning

The Ebola outbreak has had an adverse economic impact on the affected countries, reversing development gains and positive economic growth. Agricultural fieldwork has been disrupted in many areas, threatening livelihoods and food security. It is the restriction on the movement of goods and people, however, as well as the closure of markets, that is leaving thousands without access to their livelihoods and sources of income. Major international private companies, particularly in the mining and forestry sectors, have slowed down or stopped their activities. The closure of banks has restricted access to financial resources for investment and consumer activities. Mining and tourism, two main sources of formal employment and revenue, have reduced operations.

According to recent studies by UNDP and the Economic Commission for Africa study *Socioeconomic Impacts of the Ebola Virus Disease on Africa*, the prices of vegetable oil, rice and potatoes have increased by 20-30 per cent in some rural areas of Liberia and the price of rice has increased by at least 30 per cent in Sierra Leone. The negative impact of the Ebola outbreak on the economies of the affected countries is compounded by the suspension of activities of many foreign investors and the collapse of cross-border trade due to border closures. Household incomes in affected countries have suffered, plummeting from around 12 per cent in Guinea to 35 per cent in Liberia and posing a potential threat to peace and stability. Compared with 2013, job losses linked to the outbreak have increased by an average of 3 per cent in the transportation sector, 6.8 per cent in the telecommunications sector, 8.6 per cent in the hospitality and tourism sectors, and 22.9 per cent in the building and public works sectors.

Complementing the individual country economic impact studies conducted in collaboration with national Governments, UNDP has completed the socioeconomic assessment report *Assessing the Socioeconomic Impacts of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone: the Road to Recovery*. In the assessment, UNDP highlights that the short-term fiscal impacts are $93 million (4.7 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP)) for Liberia, $79 million (1.8 per cent of GDP) for Sierra Leone and $120 million (1.8 per cent of GDP) for Guinea.

Social safety net cash transfer programmes, which combine incentives for educational development, adult literacy, livelihoods support and essential cash assistance, are being provided for people who have lost their livelihoods as a result of the crisis. With the support of UNDP, social safety net initiatives started in Liberia on 2 December, with support to bush meat traders affected by the preventive ban on bush meat. A similar programme for the most impoverished, vulnerable people in the affected countries targeting 15,000 households will commence in January. In Sierra Leone, 5,000 vulnerable households and 1,250 youth are being targeted through cash-for-work and skill-building for alternative livelihood programmes. UNDP is also working with trade unions and the private sector to develop Ebola safety standards and procedures for select groups of traders to enable them to attract business.

In terms of next steps in recovery planning, on 12 December, at my request, the Deputy Secretary-General tasked UNDP with leading the United Nations system effort on Ebola-related recovery. Within the framework of the 2008 tripartite agreement between the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union, UNDP has advocated for the implementation of a joint Ebola recovery assessment to identify the critical areas for recovery interventions and to design integrated, multisectoral national and regional recovery plans. A number of consultations have been held in preparation for an Ebola recovery assessment mission to the region, which is slated for mid-January 2015.

Preventing outbreaks in non-affected countries

The United Nations system, through UNMEER, will work to foster increased cross-border cooperation on Ebola response efforts between the affected countries and neighbouring States that go beyond ensuring effective border control measures and include cooperation on contact tracing, laboratory testing and treatment options.

The 9 December technical meeting on cross-border cooperation in Liberia was a first positive step in that direction.

WHO and other United Nations system agencies will also work to strengthen Ebola prevention and preparedness capacity in the non-affected priority countries of Africa. International Ebola preparedness missions have so far assessed the level of Ebola prevention and preparedness capacities in 14 of the 15 priority countries in Africa originally identified by WHO: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. On the basis of the WHO consolidated Ebola virus disease preparedness checklist, the missions recommended that the countries establish functional rapid response teams, identify Ebola isolation facilities and train health-care workers in Ebola case management, contact tracing and infection prevention and control. In addition, the United Nations system, through UNMEER, provided technical advice on the revision of the Ebola prevention and preparedness plan of Ghana and helped improve the capacity of the Ebola treatment unit that the country had established in the port city of Tema. Similar support is planned for all immediate at-risk countries visited to date.

On 11 and 12 December 2014, WHO convened a high-level meeting in Geneva on strengthening health systems and resilience in the three most affected countries. The meeting brought together health and finance ministers, non-State actors, donors and international technical agencies with the aim of laying the foundation for stronger health systems in the medium-to-long term in the Ebola-affected countries. It identified the main constraints and challenges faced by countries in rebuilding and developing more resilient health systems; the medium-to-long-term solutions on how to best build and invest in national and subnational systems that deliver basic, essential and good-quality health services that can also respond adequately to future emergencies and crises; and, based on the comparative advantage of each entity, the roles and responsibilities of all the stakeholder groups on their contribution to building resilient health systems in countries, in a coordinated manner under country leadership. At the meeting it was agreed that the three most affected countries, in cooperation with partners, including WHO, would prepare national and regional plans and present them to a meeting hosted by the World Bank in April 2015.

Conclusions

The global response to the Ebola outbreak has made a difference, yet we must not be complacent. The outbreak is still a public health emergency of international concern. The United Nations system will continue to scale up its efforts and we count on all of our partners for greater and more robust support so that, together, we may stop the outbreak.

At the same time, we must also start to think about addressing the broader early recovery needs of the three most affected countries, especially in the health and education sectors, and building longer-term resilience so that countries have the capacity to address future disease outbreaks. Where it is possible to do so without compromising speed and efficacy in containing the virus, the Ebola response must strive to assist in building resilience and stronger health-care systems in the affected countries.

Early recovery efforts must begin now and should be integrated into the response strategy through an increased focus on the provision of essential services.

Any Ebola-related stigma and discrimination must be identified and addressed. Social protection that responds to the needs of survivors, affected households and communities must also be part of early recovery responses that aim to rebuild livelihoods and market activity in the affected countries.

Containing the outbreak will require continued support and engagement of the international community. The second phase of the response, focused on hunting the virus in every district, will have additional resource implications. The cost of continued global risks of outbreaks is significantly higher, however. I call upon Member States to continue to prioritize the response to maintain the tremendous momentum achieved.

To date, more than $1.16 billion has been received, committed or pledged by donors to fund the revised overview of needs and requirements for the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund has received $141 million in commitments, pledges and deposits. I thank all those who have contributed. The amounts committed, however, still fall short of the required $1.5 billion and the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund is aiming to raise $500 million before March 2015. I therefore call upon all countries in a position to do so to contribute or to contribute more.

While the response needs additional financial resources, it is in even greater need of qualified and experienced staff in critical areas such as epidemiology, social mobilization, infection prevention and control, and logistics. As the focus of the response shifts to early detection and rapid response at the district level, we need qualified field staff on the ground to carry out core response tasks and train national health personnel, thereby building local capacity. This will not only be crucial in containing the outbreak, but also strengthen the local health systems after the end of the Ebola crisis.

As I have said from the early stages of this crisis, the needs go beyond financial resources. Given the centrality of finding every case and every contact to stop transmission, we must scale up our capacities and field presence in areas with high caseloads to further strengthen and expand contact tracing. More community mobilizers need to be recruited and trained to increase awareness of Ebola transmission, prevention, treatment and safe burial practices. Governments need adequate numbers of well-distributed facilities where national personnel receive training and support to provide clinical care, laboratory services and crisis management. Logistics bottlenecks must also be overcome in order to ensure timely food and health assistance to quarantined communities. Stronger and more reliable transportation networks to connect isolation and care centres to laboratories are needed, for which donations of motorcycles are essential.

Skilled international personnel are needed to establish and sustain district-level Ebola treatment units. Insufficient laboratory capacity results in treatment delays due to backlogs of Ebola test samples, increasing risks of transmission to others in the community from undiagnosed Ebola patients. There is also a need to ensure that Ebola-related medical waste, which can be a strong purveyor of the virus, is managed safely and in environmentally sustainable ways.

The focus on a district-level approach requires greater and more dispersed resources. Field crisis managers and the district response teams they lead will be pivotal in enabling broad geographical coverage, while ensuring a high level of

operational effectiveness. Technical health experts, such as epidemiologists and infection prevention and control experts, are needed to track the disease and train and empower local staff involved in case finding, contact tracing and surveillance teams. In addition, rapid response capacities are required at the national and regional levels to enable the rapid deployment of resources to respond to sudden flare-ups of the disease.

Ebola still places a heavy burden on the people of the most affected countries, and we have much more work to do to contain it. At the same time, tremendous progress has been achieved in the fight against Ebola during the past 90 days. As long as one case remains, there remains a risk of retransmission and the possibility of the outbreak restarting.

We must not let that happen. The United Nations is committed to doing everything possible, in solidarity with the people of Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone, and in service of all the people of the world, to end the Ebola crisis.

I commend the Governments of Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone for their leadership. I thank the thousands of national and international medical responders serving on the front lines of the response.

I extend my thanks to all Member States, regional organizations and donors who have contributed to this fight. I applaud your contributions and ask you to be ready to give more. I express my appreciation for the United Nations staff, non-governmental organizations and civil society actors who are playing an instrumental enabling role in the response.

On 3 January, my new Special Representative and Head of UNMEER, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, assumed his functions. I ask you to extend to him your support and continued cooperation as he moves into this role. I thank Anthony Banbury for his service during the critical start-up phase of UNMEER and for his excellent work in getting the Mission operational on the ground.

Finally, on behalf of the United Nations family, I wish to recognize the sacrifice and honourable service of Marcel Rudasingwa, the Ebola Crisis Manager for Guinea who sadly passed away on 18 November, and I extend my condolences to his family.

I would be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations A/69/721

General Assembly

Distr.: General
12 January 2015

Original: English

Sixty-ninth session
Agenda item 112 (d)
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections

Election of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Note by the Secretary-General

1. By its decision 59/420, the General Assembly, on the proposal of the Secretary-General (see A/59/241) elected Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for a period of five years, beginning on 15 June 2005 and ending on 14 June 2010. By its decision 64/419, the Assembly re-elected Mr. Guterres for a period of five years, beginning on 15 June 2010 and ending on 14 June 2015.

2. The Secretary-General proposes to the General Assembly that the term of office of Mr. Guterres be extended until 31 December 2015.

3. In accordance with the above-mentioned provision of the General Assembly, members may wish to recall that, by paragraph 9 of its resolution 58/153, the Assembly decided to remove the temporal limitation on the continuation of the Office of the High Commissioner contained in its resolution 57/186 and to continue the Office until the refugee problem was solved.

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